What Is General Law?

What Is General Law
General law means territorial law of a country. It consists of all persons, things, acts and events within the territory of a country which are governed by it. General law consists of those legal rules of which the courts take judicial notice.

What is the meaning of general laws?

General Laws are Session Laws or sections of Session Laws that are permanent in nature and of general application. General Laws are codified according to subject matter in a multi-volume publication entitled the General Laws of Massachusetts. The official version of the General Laws is now published every two years, with cumulative pamphlets released periodically.

  1. This site provides an unofficial version of the General Laws, available through the index below or search feature.
  2. NOTICE: This is NOT the official version of the General Laws of Massachusetts.
  3. While reasonable efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of the data provided, do not rely on this information without first checking the Official Edition of the General Laws of Massachusetts.

If you are in need of legal advice or counsel, please consult a lawyer. This site is periodically updated to reflect any changes made to the General Laws. This site includes all amendments to the General Laws passed before June 30, 2022, for laws enacted since that time, see the 2022 Session Laws,

What is an example of a general law?

General law is one of two universal legal categories or types of law common to any number of territories, countries, and nation states. Also known as public law or local law, laws of this type are characterized as applying to all residents and citizens of a particular area or district.

  • Such laws are further characterized by unrestricted time, meaning general laws do not expire, nor do such laws apply only at certain times, in certain situations, or only to certain citizens or groups of citizens.
  • Laws intended as general or public law are always in force, applicable to all citizens, and only change when legislative bodies modify the law.

When enacted, general law governs the relationship between a citizen and applicable governing bodies. Relationships involved in this area of law may cover a citizens’ relationship with local city or county municipalities; state agencies and governmental departments; or federal regulatory agencies, commissions, and governing bodies.

A citizen’s responsibility for paying taxes, following rules of the road while driving, and the use of business licenses are each examples of relationships between citizens and government covered by general law. In contrast, private law, the other category of laws, governs the relationship between individual citizens.

Family law covering situations such as divorce and adoption, inheritance law, and similar examples illustrate the concept of private law. What Is General Law General laws enacted by states cannot supersede general federal laws enacted by the U.S. Congress. In terms of authority, acts and statutes that fall under general law only have as much power as the legislative body that enacts them. Laws governing residents or citizens of a specific district cannot assume more control over those individuals than constitutionally awarded to the enacting legislative body. What Is General Law General laws apply to all residents and citizens of a particular area or district. One exception exists with regard to what citizen to government regulations are covered by general law. Most often, conflicts of law, even those directly relating to the relationship between citizen and government, are not considered part of this area of law.

What is general law in Australia?

1.1 Legislation and the general law Legislation is written against the background of the general law. The general law is the law that exists apart from legislation. The general law consists of the common law and the principles of equity, which are applicable in Queensland because of its history as a colony of the United Kingdom.

The general law emerged from the history of the United Kingdom and did not rely on laws made by Parliament for its existence. The general law is commonly referred to as judge made law because it is found in decisions of judges on particular cases brought before them. However, generally speaking, the contemporary role of a judge is essentially to declare the existing general law, not to make new law.

In Australia, only a Parliament may make legislation or authorise the making of legislation. However, because judges have the role of applying the laws of interpretation, if there is a dispute about the meaning of legislation, the judges decide the dispute.

What is the full definition of law?

: a binding custom or practice of a community : a rule of conduct or action prescribed (see prescribe sense 1a) or formally recognized as binding or enforced by a controlling authority. (2) : the whole body of such customs, practices, or rules. The courts exist to uphold, interpret, and apply the law.

What are the characteristics of general law?

Principles of Rule of Law: – According to the World Justice Projects definition, rule of law is a system in which the following four principles are upheld. These are also known as the four universal principles of rule of law: 1. Accountability

The government and its officials, its agents as well as individuals and private entities are accountable under the law.

2. Just law

The laws are clear, publicized, stable and just; and are applied evenly; and protect fundamental rights including the security of the persons and property.

3. Open government

The process by which the law is enacted, administered and enforced is accessible, fair and efficient.

4. Access and impartial justice

Justice to be delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and neutrals.

What is the difference between general and special law?

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence April 1948 – Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions SECOND DIVISION ROSARIO VALERA, assisted by her husband, Juan Valera, Petitioner, v. MARIANO TUASON, Jr., Justice of the Peace of Lagayan, Abra, MANUEL TULLAS ET AL., Respondents-Appellees, THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL, Intervenor-Appellee, Marcelino N. Sayo, for Petitioner-Appellant,

  • Etelboldo Valera, for Respondents-Appellees Tullas Et. Al.
  • The justice of the peace in his own behalf,
  • SYLLABUS 1.
  • STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PROVISIONS OF A LAW OR OF TWO LAWS TO BE HARMONIZED; IMPLIED REPEAL.
  • Endeavor should be made to harmonize the provisions of a law or of two laws so that each shall be effective.

In order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act. (U.S.v. Palacios, 33 Phil., 208.) Merely because a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the new law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one.

  • Statutory Construction, Crawford, p.634.) 2.
  • ID.; ID.; ID.; JUSTICE OF THE PEACE; DISQUALIFICATION; TRANSFER OF CASE TO NEAREST JUSTICE OF THE PEACE; SECTION 73 OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND SECTION 211 OF REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE BOTH IN FORCE.
  • By a fair and reasonable construction, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, may be said to apply to disqualifications under section 8 of that Act, and section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code to disqualifications or disabilities not embraced in the Code of Civil Procedure.

Both provisions can stand together.3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL LAW WHEN REPEALED BY GENERAL LAW; SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER GENERAL LAW; GENERAL LAW AND SPECIAL LAW DEFINED. — A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest.

  1. Generalia specialibus non derogant.
  2. And this is true although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter in the special statute.
  3. Manila Railroad Company v.
  4. Rafferty, 40 Phil., 224.) At any rate, in the event harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute, considered in its entirely, indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature.

Granting then that the two laws can not be reconciled, in so far as they are inconsistent with each other, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being a specific law, should prevail over, or be considered as an exception to section 211 of the Administrative Code, which is a provision of general character.

A general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class, while a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class. (Statutory Construction, Crawford, p.265.) 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 73 OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE NOT REPEALED OR ABSORBED BY RULES OF COURT.

– There is less reason to hold that section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been impliedly repealed or absorbed by the Rules of Court than that it has been abrogated by section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code; for the authority of a judge to try a case is a matter of substantive law, not embraced by the purposes and scope of the Rules of Court which concern “pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines, and the admission to the practice of law therein.” (Introductory section of the Rules of Court.) D E C I S I O N TUASON, J.

  • This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra dismissing a petition for certiorari,
  • It results that a complaint for forcible entry was filed in the justice of the peace court of Lagayan over which Judge Federico Paredes presided.
  • Finding himself disqualified, by reason of relationship to one of the parties, to try the case, Judge Paredes transferred it to the justice of the peace of La Paz, the nearest municipality to Lagayan.

The latter justice of the peace, over the objection of the attorney for the defendants, proceeded with the trial, after which he gave judgment for the plaintiff and returned the record of the case with his decision to the justice of the peace of Lagayan.

  • In the meantime, a new justice of the peace had been appointed for Lagayan — Mariano B.
  • Tuason, one of the respondents in the petition for certiorari,
  • After the case was received in the court of the justice of the peace of Lagayan, the defendants moved for a new trial impeaching the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace of La Paz.

The new justice of the peace of Lagayan found the challenge well founded, declared the judgment null and void, and ordered the case reset for hearing before him. The Lagayan justice’s ground for unvalidating the decision of the justice of the peace of La Paz is that “the designation of another justice of the peace to hear, try and decide a given case, when the justice having jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the same disqualifies himself, is not in law given to the disqualifying justice but ‘to the judge of the district’ who ‘shall designate the nearest justice of the peace.’ (Section 211, Rev.

Adm. Code).” He believes that the circular of the Secretary of Justice of January 17, 1940, in pursuance of which the case was transferred, is legally wrong. (The circular states that “when a justice of the peace is merely disqualified to try a certain case, he should transmit, without notifying the district judge, the record thereof to the justice of the peace of the nearest municipality in accordance with section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” ) The annulment by the newly-appointed justice of the peace of Lagayan of the proceedings before the justice of the peace of La Paz and the latter’s decision was sustained on appeal by Honorable Patricio Ceniza, Judge of the Court of First Instance, but on a different ground.

Judge Ceniza does not agree that section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code has repealed section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.190.) He is of the opinion that it is the new Rules of Court which have abrogated the last-named section. Section 73 of Act No.190 as amended provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library In every case, whether civil or criminal, of disqualification of a justice of the peace upon any ground mentioned in section eight of this Act, the regular justice shall notify the auxilliary, who shall thereupon appear and try the cause, unless he shall be likewise disqualified or otherwise disabled, in which event the cause shall be transferred to the nearest justice of the peace of the province who is not disqualified.

Section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Auxilliary justice — Qualifications and duties. — The auxilliary justice of the peace shall have the same qualifications and be subject to the same restrictions as the regular justice, and shall perform the duties of said office during any vacancy therein or in case of the absence of the regular justice from the municipality, or of his disability or disqualification, or in case of his death or resignation until the appointment and qualification of his successor, or in any cause whose immediate trial the regular justice shall certify to be specially urgent and which he is unable to try by reason of actual engagement in another trial.

In case there is no auxilliary justice of the peace to perform the duties of the regular justice in the cases above mentioned, the judge of the district shall designate the nearest justice of the peace of the province to act as justice of the peace in such municipality, town, or place, in which case the justice of the peace so designated shall have jurisdiction and shall receive the total of his own salary and seventy-five per centum of the salary of the justice of the peace whom he may substitute.

One of the well-established rules of statutory construction enjoins that endeavor should be made to harmonize the provisions of a law or of two laws so that each shall be effective. In order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act.

(U.S.v. Palacios, 33 Phil., 208.) Merely because a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the new law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one.

Statutory Construction, Crawford, p.634.) The above-quoted provisions can stand together. By a fair and reasonable construction, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, may be said to apply to disqualifications under section 8 of that Act, and section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code to disqualifications or disabilities not embraced in the Code of Civil Procedure.

From another angle the presumption against repeal is stronger. A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. Generalia specialibus non derogant. And this is true although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter in the special statute.

  1. Manila Railroad Company v.
  2. Rafferty, 40 Phil., 224.) At any rate, in the event harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute, considered in its entirety, indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature.

Granting then that the two laws can not be reconciled, in so far as they are inconsistent with each other, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being a specific law, should prevail over, or be considered as an exception to, section 211 of the Administrative Code, which is a provision of general character.

A general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class, while a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class. (Statutory Construction, Crawford, p.265.) But the history of the two laws gives positive indication that they were designed to complement each other.

This history reveals that the two enactments have different origins, one independent of the other, and have been intended to operate side by side. This intent is apparent from the fact that, in their respective process of evolution, they, at one time, in Act No.1627, met and were lodged in adjoining sections — 7 and 8 — each maintaining a separate and independent identity; and while, later, section 7 of Act No.1627 was amended by section 3 of Act No.1741, section 8 was given a different direction by being amended by another law, section 1 of Act 1888.

  1. We further note that the final section of the Administrative Code expressly repealed section 7 of Act 1627 and the entire Act 1741 but made no reference whatever to section 73 of Act 190, section 8 of Act 1627, or section 1 of Act 1888.
  2. The purpose to keep both laws in force and subsisting can find no clearer proof than this unless it be an express declaration of intention.

For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, Judge Ceniza’s opinion that the Rules of Court have replaced and absorbed section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure is clearly erroneous. It may be said that there is less reason to hold that this section has been impliedly repealed by the Rules of Court than that it has been abrogated by section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code; for the authority of a judge to try a case is a matter of substantive law, not embraced by the purposes and scope of the Rules of Court, which concern “pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines, and the admission to the practice of law therein.” (Introductory section of the Rules of Court.) Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed with costs against the appellee.

What are the 4 general sources of law?

To understand the legal research process, begin with how our legal system works. The United States legal system has two major systems of government, federal and state, each of which has its own set of laws. The four sources of federal and state law are:

  1. c onstitutions;
  2. statutes and ordinances;
  3. rules and regulations; and
  4. case law.

Constitutions Constitutions are the foundation of our legal system. All governmental authority flows from the United States Constitution and the state constitutions. The United States Constitution is the “supreme law of the land” and no laws, state or federal, may violate it.

  • Legislative branches enact laws called statutes and ordinances.
  • Executive branches enforce and implement these laws through rules and regulations.
  • Judicial branches interpret these laws by deciding cases and issuing written opinions.
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This guide will cover how to research the laws created by all three branches of the government.

What are the two types of law in Australia?

Sources of law – There are two main sources of law in Australia, case law or common law, based on the decisions of judges in the superior courts, and legislation, the law made by Parliament. Sources of law : Last Revised: Thu Jul 31st 2014 The content of the Law Handbook is made available as a public service for information purposes only and should not be relied upon as a substitute for legal advice.

Who makes general law?

There are three different types of law.

Statute Law is the law made by Parliament. It is introduced in a Bill and, if passed, becomes an Act.

Common Law is judge-made law, developed through centuries of precedent, or earlier judgements on cases before courts. The Commonwealth and States’ Constitutions set out the basic structure of the legal and parliamentary systems.

Regulations are also known as Subordinate or Delegated Legislation. Some Acts only outline broad guidelines or principles, leaving details to be defined later in regulations made through a Minister (e.g. Traffic Act, Planning Laws). A Parliamentary committee reviews regulations and Parliament may alter them. This Legislation Review Committee also considers whether or not proposed bills have any negative impact on citizens’ “personal rights and liberties”.

Making Statute Law in New South Wales follows much the same steps as in most other Australian states, the Australian Federal Parliament, and the British Parliament upon which our system of Government is based. Under a bicameral system, bills (or proposed laws) pass through several stages in both of the Houses of Parliament, before being sent to the Governor for assent.

Bills that have received assent are known as Acts. Bills can be introduced into either House of Parliament, with the exception of money bills (see below) which must originate in the Legislative Assembly. Bills introduced by ministers are considered during the time allocated for government business. Bills introduced by private members are considered during the time allocated for general business.

The Passage of Legislation Understanding an Act

How many types of law are there?

In the constitution of India, every citizen has been given several rights and since the rights are provided, there will infringement of those rights as well. Our legislature has introduced various laws to enforce and protect such rights, in order to civilize the society and maintain peace and harmony among the individuals.

Law is basically a set of rules that are created and enforced by a particular country or community through social or governmental institutions to regulate the actions of its members. India has a federal judicial system which is primarily based on mixed law i.e. based on parliamentary legislature, court laws, customary & religious laws as well.

The Indian Judicial System is developed by judges through their decisions, orders, and judgments. There are five types of legal system i.e. civil law; common law ; customary law; religious law and mixed law. Types of law In Indian Judicial System there are four types of law.1.

  1. Criminal law The Criminal law is enforced by the police.
  2. Cases like murder, rape, assault, robbery are dealt under Criminal Law.
  3. Offenses which are committed against any individual but are seen as being against everybody, even though it does not, come under the Criminal law.
  4. For example, if house is burgled then the theft is against the individual, but it threatens all house owners because they might have burgled their houses.

Because the view is taken that everybody is threatened by the crime this law is dealt with the public services and not by private investigators.2. Civil law The Civil law is law that looks at actions that are not the crime. It is a section of law dealing with disputes between organizations and individuals.

  1. It covers different areas such as defamation, custody of children, right to education, divorce, trade union membership, property disputes, ownership issues, Copy Right, insurance claims etc.
  2. For example, a person by force took over someone else property without his/her permission and not vacating it or one company sue another over a trade dispute or car crash victims claims from the driver for loss or injury sustained in an accident.3.

Common law The Common Law also known as case law or Judicial precedent or judge-made law is a section of law which is derived from the judicial decision of courts and similar tribunals. As the name suggests it is common to all. The example set by higher courts is binding on cases tried in lower courts.

Lower courts can also choose to overturn the precedent, but this rarely occurs. Example of a common law marriage is when two people have lived together for 10 or more years. They have thus and legal rights to share their assets because of it.4. Statutory law Statute or Statutory Law is a law established by an act of the legislature that is signed by the executive or legislative body.

For state law, the acts are passed by the state legislature and signed by the state governor. In rare circumstances, the executive (President or governor) may refuse to sign the bill or reject it, which is known as a “veto.” A bill is proposed in the legislature and voted upon.

What are the two types of law?

When your legal research involves case law (or common law), it is important to know something about the significance of precedents or the doctrine of stare decisis, which refers to “adhering to or abiding by” settled decisions. Simply put, lower courts are bound to follow decisions of higher courts in the same jurisdiction.

For example, a federal district court in Maryland is required to follow the decisions of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court, but it is not bound by the decisions of other district courts or by the Maryland state courts. Historically, this doctrine has hindered women in the courts, because once a precedent has been set, it is difficult to receive a different ruling unless the law that the judges or justices are interpreting is itself changed.

Recently, however, stare decisis has been one of the major reasons that women have won cases concerning employment in the courts. Many precedents based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 favor women. State legal materials resemble federal legal materials in many ways, but there are differences in the types of publications in which they are readily available.

The nature of legal materials and publishing practices may differ depending on jurisdiction. Resources on the federal level are easier to obtain because materials are published by both private and government publishers.U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) publications are readily available in government depository collections in libraries across the United States.

Each state, however, follows its own publishing practices. Differences are especially significant in the publication of court decisions. Many decisions regarding women’s issues have been rendered on the trial level in state courts, and few state trial court decisions are published, because they do not establish legal precedent.

What are the two general classification of law?

Legal rights are generally divided into two categories criminal law and civil law. It is important to note that the nature of the classification is based on the fact that there are significant differences in the law’s objectives, procedures, and terminology.

What is an example of a general characteristic?

Characteristic Examples – There are many general characteristics and functions of a living organism that define life. They are order, sensitivity or response to the environment, reproduction, growth and development, regulation, homeostasis, energy processing, adaptation through evolution, and metabolism. These characteristics set living things apart from non-living things,

Order : An individual or organism is made up of a cell or a group of cells. The cells are arranged in a highly organized and coordinated way. Some organisms are single-celled (made up of only one cell) or multicellular, which characteristically refers to having multiple cells. In multicellular organisms, similar cells combine and form tissues, The tissue will lead to the formation of different body organs. Organs work together and form an organ system. Multiple organ systems work in coordination and form an individual.

Sensitivity or Response to Stimuli: an organism’s characteristic is that it is capable of responding to a stimulus, For example, bacteria show phototaxis behavior. The tendency of an organism to move towards or away from light is called phototaxis, And so for instance, based on their response to light, bacteria may then be categorized as photophilic (thriving in light, and so they move toward the light source) or photophobic (sensitive to light, thus they move away from the light source). Reproduction: reproduction is the characteristic of organisms to produce offspring similar to their parents. Many single-celled organisms reproduce by the duplication of their DNA and then the cell divides to form two new cells. This is binary fission, which is an example of an asexual mode of reproduction, In multicellular organisms, special cells called gametes are produced for use in a sexual mode of reproduction,

Growth and Development: different organisms grow differently according to the instructions encoded in their genes. These genes provide the information about growth and development of the organism. The genes that they inherit from their parents account for the fundamental and common characteristics that they may share with their parents.

Regulation and homeostasis : even unicellular organisms are complex. They need multiple regulation mechanisms to maintain the body’s functions in a coordinated and well-organized way. Organisms either unicellular or multicellular need to maintain internal body functions, respond to the stimuli, and cope with the fluctuation of the external environment. Blood flow and transportation of nutrients are two examples of internal function regulation. Organs are performing their specific function like carrying oxygen throughout the body, removing waste materials, transporting nutrients to every cell of the body, and keeping the body temperature at optimum level.

Let’s take for example bacteria. Not all bacteria can survive high temperatures but thermophiles, Thermophiles are characterized by their ability to withstand temperatures between 41 and 122 °C, which would otherwise kill most bacteria.

Another example is thermoregulation among animals. Some animals are cut out for a cold environment. In fact, polar bears are capable of living in cold polar regions that the other types of bears would find challenging. Polar bears can maximally conserve their body heat by having these characteristics: a greasy coat that helps reduce heat loss, black skin under the unpigmented fur that absorbs the heat of the sun (UV light), and a thick layer of blubber (4 inches) that acts as an insulator (prevents heat from letting out). On the other hand, animals that live in hot environments have other methods to dissipate body heat. For example, dogs sweat through their paws and pant to cool themselves.

What Is General Law Polar bears have dark skin covered with unpigmented fur. The fur appears white because the sun’s rays are trapped and bounce inside the hollow part of the hair (called guard hair), and eventually are emitted through luminescence. The salt particles on the hair surface (which polar bears get from swimming or being near the ocean) also tend to scatter light.

Autotrophs are characterized by having the ability to make their own food. This characteristic sets them apart from heterotrophs. Photoautotrophs, in particular, make their own food through photosynthesis. Examples are plants, They capture the energy from the sun and convert it into chemical energy (food). Heterotrophs take that chemical energy from autotrophs in the form of their food and use it for their survival. Examples of heterotrophs are animals,

Adaptation through Evolution: adaptation is the unique characteristic by which organisms adapt so that they can survive according to the environment. Although adaptation is a slow process but to face the environmental challenges in a better way, various behavioral and physical features of an organism change.

For example, earlier snakes had legs similar to lizards. They lost their legs so that they can easily go in small holes. Without legs, they can easily fit even in tighter spaces. This adaptation helps them to hide from predators.

Metabolism: Metabolism is a set of different chemical reactions which occur in a living organism for maintaining life. The different functions of metabolism are as follows: conversion of food energy into cellular energy, conversion of food into the building blocks (nucleic acids, lipids, carbohydrates, and proteins), and elimination of waste and toxic material from the body. Metabolic reactions are of two categories. They are catabolic reactions (breaking of compounds) and anabolic reactions (synthesis of compounds).

Try to answer the quiz below to check what you have learned so far about characteristics.

What does Aristotle mean by general law?

Aristotle’s Philosophy of Law (1) Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation, Bowling Green, OH, USA Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. at Stagira in northern Greece, the son of Nicomachus, a physician of King Amyntas II of Macedonia. At age seventeen he entered Plato’s Academy in Athens, where he studied for nineteen years.

In addition to composing a number of dialogues now lost, he may have then begun work on his Rhetoric, After Plato’s death (348) Aristotle grew alienated from the school and soon after left Athens. He resided at Assos, where he married Pythias, the niece of the philosophically trained tyrant Hermeias, and then lived at Mytilene on Lesbos.

In 343 he was invited by King Philip of Macedonia to educate his thirteen-year-old son Alexander. Subsequently, Philip and his successor, Alexander, defeated an alliance of Greek city-states, and most of Greece—including Athens—submitted to Macedonian hegemony while Alexander was conquering the Persian Empire.

  1. Aristotle returned to Athens in 335 after the death of Philip and became a metic (resident alien).
  2. He founded his school at the Lyceum outside the city and began the most productive stage of his career.
  3. He offered lectures on technical philosophy (logic, physics, and metaphysics) in the morning, and on more popular subjects (rhetoric, ethics, and politics) in the evening.

He also collected a celebrated library, and with his students compiled descriptions of 158 constitutions. During this period he probably composed most of his greatest treatises, including much of the Politics, After his wife’s death he took a mistress, Herpyllis of Stagira, who gave birth to Nicomachus, after whom the Nicomachean Ethics was named.

This work is probably Aristotle’s revision of an earlier work, the Eudemian Ethics, from which three books were reused ( Eudemian Ethics, Books IV–VI becoming Nicomachean Ethics, Books V–VII). After Alexander’s sudden death, the Athenians rose up against the Macedonians. Aristotle, who was a friend of Alexander’s viceroy, Antipater, bore the brunt of anti-Macedonian sentiment.

Charged with impiety he left Athens lest she “sin twice against philosophy.” Appointing Theophrastus his successor as head of the Lyceum, Aristotle retreated to Chalcis, where he died soon after (322). According to an ancient tradition, Aristotle’s writings were lost after his death and only rediscovered in the first century B.C.

  1. Andronicus of Rhodes assembled numerous papyrus scrolls into treatises, which were recopied in manuscripts over two millennia.
  2. Consequently, the works of Aristotle as we now have them raise many difficulties.
  3. This applies to the major works that contain Aristotle’s legal philosophy: the Politics, the Nicomachean Ethics, and the Rhetoric,

In the case of each of these works, scholars debate over the following questions: Were the parts of this work written at roughly the same time or do they express Aristotle’s thought at different stages of his life? Does the organization of the work reflect Aristotle’s intention or is it the construction of a later editor (which may be contrary to what Aristotle intended)? Does the work as it now exists express a coherent philosophical position? Moreover, another work that contains material on the law, Magna Moralia, may have been written not by Aristotle but by an early member of his school.

An early spurious work, Rhetoric to Alexander, also contains some relevant material. Finally, Aristotle’s 158 constitutions vanished altogether except for scattered quotations, until the rediscovery of a major fragment of the Constitution of Athens in the late nineteenth century. This work may also have been written by an early student of Aristotle during his lifetime.

The concept of law is deeply embedded in Aristotle’s political philosophy. Although legal terminology occurs frequently in his writings, Aristotle does not himself present a systematic and unitary legal treatise. Not infrequently he quotes (or paraphrases) others and appropriates their remarks, which results in considerable imprecision and apparent inconsistency in his various characterizations of law.

  1. He identifies law in different places with reason, with agreement, and with order.
  2. A reconstruction of Aristotle’s legal philosophy should explain how these different characterizations are interrelated.
  3. Aristotle’s main term for “law” is the noun nomos (plural nomoi ).
  4. Related expressions are kata ton nomon, “according to the law,” nomikos, “legal,” and nomimos, “lawful.” The noun nomimon can also have the sense of “statute.” In contrast, para ton nomon signifies “against the law,” and paranomos means “illegal” or “unlawful.” The precise meanings of these terms vary with the context.

Sometimes Aristotle speaks of written law, in contrast to unwritten custom ( ethos ), for example, that one should honor one’s parents, do good to one’s friends, and return good to one’s benefactors ( Pol. III.16.1287b5–8; EN X.9.1180b4; cf. Pseudo-Aristotle, Rhet.

Al,1.1421b35–1422a1). But he also distinguishes between unwritten law and written law ( Pol. VI.5.1319b40; EN X.9.1180a35; Rhet.I.10.1368b7, I.13.1373b4). He also uses nomos more loosely for “convention,” the sense in which nomos was opposed to phusis (“nature”) by the sophists ( SE 12.173a7–30). Aristotle’s term nomos can denote either a particular law or the law in an abstract sense.

A particular law is a rule ( kanôn ) prescribing or prohibiting various kinds of actions (see EN I.2.1094b5). For example, it commands the citizens not to leave their posts in time of war, not to commit adultery or act abusively, not to hit or slander others, and so forth (see EN V.1.1129b19–23).

Because they command and prohibit general classes of action, the laws are universal in form: “The law speaks universally” ( EN V.10.1137b13, 20; cf.7.1135a5–8). The universality of the laws has an obvious advantage: The citizens can learn what the laws require, adapt their behavior to them, and acquire the habit of obedience.

But because laws are universal, they cannot address unusual cases. For example, the assembly might want to bestow honorary citizenship on a foreign potentate who has come to the aid of the city-state ( polis ). This requires an ad hoc rule. In an authoritarian regime this is called an “edict” ( epitagma ), and in a popular constitution a “decree” ( psêphisma ).

Such rules concern individual acts to be done ( EN VI.8.1141b27–8); they cannot be universal ( Pol. IV.4.1292a37). What distinguishes a universal rule as a law? This is the question, “What is law?” in the abstract sense, which Aristotle does not address in a systematic fashion in our extant texts, although there is considerable evidence as to how he would answer it: Law is “a sort of order” ( Pol.

VII.4.1326a30; cf. III.16.1287a18; II.5.1263a23). Unfortunately, Aristotle does not explain this claim, but we can gather what it means by considering how he understands order in his metaphysical works. Order is a ratio or proportion of opposites ( Phys.

  • VIII.1.252a14–15).
  • Aristotle illustrates the concept of order in his discussion of the atomist theorists Democritus and Leucippus, who distinguished order from the relations of position and shape.
  • For example, A differs from N in shape, AN from NA in order, and A from in position (cf.
  • Metaph.I.4.985b17; Phys.I.5.188a24).
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As this illustration indicates, order is a ratio or proportion of prior and posterior elements (cf. Metaph. VII.12.1038a33). In a social context the fundamental type of priority is that of ruler to ruled: Whenever a thing is established out of a number of things and becomes a single common thing, there always appears in it a ruler and a ruled.

  • This is true whether it is formed out of continuous or discrete parts.) This is present in living things, but it derives from all of nature.
  • For even in things that do not have a soul there is a sort of rule, for example, of harmony.
  • Pol.I.5.1254a28–33) According to this principle of rulership, social order must be produced and maintained by a ruling element.

This assumption reflects the link between the Greek noun, taxis, “order” (“arrangement,” “organization,” etc.), and the verb, tassein, “to order” (“to command,” “to arrange,” etc.). Similarly, in a living organism the soul is the natural ruler and authority over the body ( de An.I.5.410b10–15; cf.

  1. Plato, Phd.79e–80a).
  2. Aristotle also compares the order of the entire cosmos to that of an army; just as military order is due to the general, cosmic order is due to God.
  3. In both cases the parts are organized for the sake of a single end ( Metaph.
  4. XII.10.1075a13ff.).
  5. Given that law is a kind of order, where does it come from? Aristotle recognizes two different causes of order: nature and reason.

In the physical world, outside of human creation, “nature is everywhere the cause of order” ( Phys. VIII.1.252a12). Aristotle here understands “nature” ( phusis ) in terms of his teleological theory that entities have natural ends. Nature provides an internal directing principle, which causes a body to move or remain at rest in a regular manner ( Phys.

II.1.192b20–3). For example, an acorn grows by nature into an oak tree. Because of its internal nature the acorn grows in an orderly manner. Hence, “order is the proper nature of perceptible objects” ( Cael. III.2.301a5–6). That is, orderliness is the natural condition of things ( GA III.10.760a31), and disorderliness is unnatural ( Cael.

III.2.301a4–5). In the realm of human production, however, it is reason rather than nature that does the ordering (see EN III.12.1119b17). For example, a builder conceives of a form of a house and imposes this form upon a heap of bricks, constructing the house through a definite sequence of stages: foundations, walls, roof, etc.

If, then, all order is due either to nature or to human reason, which of these is the cause of law? For Aristotle, the primary source of law is reason embodied in a human legislator. The Constitution of Athens describes Solon’s legislative activity at the beginning of the sixth century B.C.: Next Solon established a constitution and laid down other laws; and they stopped observing the ordinances of Draco, except those relating to murder.

They wrote up the laws on the wooden tablets, and set them up in the Stoa (porch) of the Basileus, and everyone swore to observe them. And the nine archons used to swear an oath upon the stone, declaring that they would dedicate a golden statue if they transgressed any law.

This is the origin of the oath to that effect which they take to the present day. Solon fixed his laws for a hundred years, and he ordered the constitution in the following manner, ( Ath.7.1–2) Nomothetês, the Greek word for “legislator,” derives from nomos, “law,” and tithenai, “to lay (down).” The name “legislator” thus implies that the laws owe their existence to a human producer, who is also compared to a “craftsman” ( dêmiourgos ) of the laws or constitution ( EN X.9.1180a21–2; Pol.

II.12.1273b32–3). Like a weaver or shipbuilder, the legislator imposes a certain form on his materials, in particular, on the population of the city-state ( Pol. VII.4.1325b40–1326a5). The legal order resembles cosmic order caused by God (1326a29–34). Legislators include the founders of constitutions, such as Lycurgus of Sparta and Solon of Athens, as well as assemblies or magistrates who lay down particular laws, unwritten as well as written ( Pol.

IV.1.1289a22, 14.1298a17; VI.5.1319b40; EN X.9.1180a35–b1). Aristotle would have rejected the notion of “spontaneous order” espoused by some modern social scientists. He criticizes the theories of some pre-Socratic philosophers that the order of the cosmos arose by chance from earlier events, because he holds that regular outcomes cannot result from chance events: “chance is a cause in a disorderly or haphazard way” ( MM II.8.1206b39–1207a1; cf.

Phys. II.4.196a24–b5, 8.198b34–6, and Cael. III.2.301a10). If order does not arise by nature, order can only be due to rational design. Consequently, Aristotle would have dismissed the suggestion that legal order evolves spontaneously through myriad human interactions, as if (but not in fact) “by an invisible hand.” Aristotle also recognizes, however, that the legal order can subsist only if the citizens are law abiding.

  • He thus characterizes law as a kind of common agreement ( homologia ) ( Pol.I.6.1255a6) and as, “on the whole, a sort of convention ” ( Rhet.I.15.1376b9–10; cf. Pol.
  • III.9.1280b10–11).
  • His point is not that law is merely conventional, but that ruling according to law goes hand in hand with being ruled voluntarily ( Pol.

IV.10.1295a15–16). Furthermore, he states: “The law has no power to command obedience except that of habit” ( Pol. II.8.1269a20–1). Habitual obedience is a precondition of the “compulsive power” of the law (mentioned at EN X.9.1180a21). But how is the claim that law results from agreement to be reconciled with the thesis that reason is the source of law? The answer may be sought in Aristotle’s distinction between a strict cause and a contributing cause ( sunaition ).

For example, he argues that heat is a contributing cause—but not the strict cause—of biological growth, because it does not determine when the process is complete ( de An. II.4.416a14). Similarly, the laws of Athens required the general agreement of the Athenian citizens if they were to have the force of law.

Solon’s constitution, in fact, soon failed partly due to the wealthy class’s general “dissatisfaction with the constitution because of the great change that had occurred” ( Ath.13.3). The contributions of reason and agreement are both recognized in the Aristotelian Rhetoric to Alexander : “Law, simply described, is reason defined according to the common agreement of the city-state, regulating action of every kind” (1.1420a25; cf.1422a2–3, 2.1424a9–12).

  1. The purpose of law must be understood in relation to the constitution.
  2. The following passage makes clear that the study of law is subordinate to constitutional theory: The laws ought to be laid down (and everybody does lay them down) with a view to the constitutions, but not the constitutions to the laws.

A constitution is the ordering of offices in city-states: in what way the offices are distributed, what element has authority in the constitution, and what is the end of each community. But the laws which are separate from those revealing the constitution are those according to which the magistrates should rule and guard against violators of them.

  • Pol, IV.1.1289a13–20) Like law, the constitution ( politeia ) is a sort of “order” (cf. Pol.
  • III.1.1274b38), which provides the answer to three questions: (1) How are political offices distributed? (2) What is the sovereign or authoritative element? (3) What is the end of the city-state? Aristotle devotes considerable attention to the first two questions, and, from this viewpoint, the constitution is identified with the government ( politeuma ) (III.6.1278b8–11).

Hence, some translators render politeia as “regime.” But insofar as politeia signifies the order or “form” of the city-state (III.2.1276b7), it corresponds to “constitution.” Although the Greek city-states did not have written constitutions in the modern sense, the constitutions were often administered by means of written laws, as in the case of Solon.

The above passage (IV.1.1289a13–20) distinguishes three kinds of laws: laws that reveal the constitution, that is, laws regarding the orderly selection of officials (cf. III.16.1287a18); laws administered by magistrates, presumably to maintain order among the citizenry; and laws concerning the prevention and punishment of crime.

Such laws are necessary: “The salvation of the city-state depends on the laws” ( Rhet.I.4.1360a19–20; cf. Pol.V.9.1310a34–6). And “where the laws have no authority,” Aristotle declares, “there is no constitution” ( Pol, IV.4.1292a32). Yet the laws are subordinate to the constitution, and the constitution is the first concern of the legislator (III.1.1274b37).

The constitution has to do with the end or goal of the city-state. This is correctly defined by the basic principles of Aristotle’s political philosophy: First, the city-state exists for the sake of the good life or happiness ( Pol.I.2.1252b30, III.9.1281a1–2). Hence, the legislator should try to fashion laws that will tend to produce and protect happiness and its components for the political community (see EN V.1.1129b17–25).

Second, the best life or happiness consists of a life of virtuous activity ( EN I.7.1098a16; Pol. III.9.1281a2–3, VII.1.1323b40– 1324a2). Therefore, the highest purpose of the legislator is to make the citizens virtuous ( EN X.9.1180b23–5). When the laws are “laid down correctly,” they command the citizens “to live according to each excellence and us to live according to each vice” (V.2.1130b23–4, 1.1129b23–5).

From this standpoint the constitution is “the way of life of the city-state” ( Pol. IV.11.1295a40). Citizens who are habituated under the laws acquire self-ruling souls: that is, they are governed by reason rather than appetite. Having internalized the law, a virtuous individual becomes “a law unto himself” ( EN IV.8.1128a32; Pol.

III.13.1284a13). Just as a doctor accepts as a given that health is his aim, “a statesman does not deliberate about whether he shall produce good law, nor does any one else deliberate about his end” ( EN III.3.1112b14–15; cf. EE I.5.1216b18; cf. Pol. III.9.1280b6).

  1. Good law ( eunomia ) is defined in normative terms: “aw is a certain order, and good law is good order” ( Pol.
  2. VII.4.1326a29–31).
  3. By “good law,” however, Aristotle means not merely that the laws are good, but that the city-state is in a good legal condition: Good law does not consist in laying down good laws, if they are not obeyed.

We must therefore suppose that good law in one way consists in the actual obedience to the laws that have been framed, and in another way it consists in the fact that the laws that are actually obeyed are laid down nobly (for laws laid down badly can also be obeyed).

  1. Pol. IV.8.1294a3–7; cf.
  2. MA 10.703a30–4) A city-state with good law is like a virtuous person who knows the right thing to do and acts accordingly.
  3. But it may happen that a legislator frames good laws that the citizens fail to obey.
  4. For example, the Athenians did not abide by the constitution of Solon, and the tyrant Pisistratus soon after rose to power (see Ath.13–14).

Such an inconstant city-state resembles a morally weak person: “t passes the decrees it should and has excellent laws, but makes no use of them” ( EN VII.10.1152a20–1). There is thus a close connection among Aristotle’s different characterizations of law as “order,” “reason,” and “agreement.” Laws are general rules that produce a kind of order in the actions and desires of the citizens, which are devised in a rational manner by a legislator, and which are effective only if the governed accept and obey them.

Because legislation is a rational activity, it is the appropriate subject for an Aristotelian science. The special science called “legislative” ( nomothetikê ) belongs to the second of the three main Aristotelian divisions of the sciences: contemplative, practical, and productive ( Top. VI.6.145a15–16; Metaph.

VI.1.1025b25, XI.7.1064a16–19; EN VI.2.1139a26–8). Each has a distinctive aim. The end of contemplative thought (e.g., physics, mathematics, and theology) is knowledge or truth for its own sake; the end of productive thought (e.g., poetry, medicine, and architecture) is the creation of an object distinct from the productive activity; and the end of practical thought is good action for its own sake.

“Practical” thought is so called because it aims at action ( praxis ). The excellence of practical thought is practical wisdom or prudence ( phronêsis ), which issues in true judgments about actions that are good or bad for a human being (cf. EN VI.5.1140b4–6). This has three subtypes: practical wisdom concerned with the individual, economics ( oikonomikê ) concerned with the household ( oikos ), and political science (“politics” for short) concerned with the city-state.

Politics includes legislative science ( nomothetikê ) and politics in a more familiar sense, involving everyday political activities such as deliberation and adjudication ( EN VI.8.1141b29–33; EE I.8.1218b12–14). The latter are concerned with particular circumstances; for example, a judge must determine whether a particular crime was committed or not ( Rhet.I.1.1354b13–15).

Thus, legislative science is a part of politics ( EN X.9.1180b30–1). Aristotle conjoins the term “legislator” with “statesman” ( politikos ) ( Pol. III.1.1274b37, IV.1.1288b27, V.9.1309b35; cf. EN I.13.1102a7–10), and he likens the laws to “acts of political science” ( EN X.9.1181a23). Aristotle views legislative science as the capstone of politics: Of the practical wisdom concerned with the city-state, the practical wisdom which plays a controlling role is legislative, while that which is related to this as particulars to their universal is known by the common name of “political.” This is capable of action and deliberation, for a decree is a thing to be carried out in the form of an individual act.

That is why the exponents of this art are alone said to take part in politics; for these alone do things as manual laborers do things. ( EN VI.8.1141b24–9) Legislative science is thus the “master science” of the human good ( EN I.2.1094a26–b7). The study of legislation, and in particular constitutional theory, is needed to bring “the philosophy of human affairs” to completion (X.9.1181a12–15).

  • Aristotle discusses in Politics IV.1–2 the tasks of “the legislator and true statesman” (1288b27).
  • Any complete science or craft must study a wide range of issues concerning its subject matter.
  • Political (i.e., legislative) science studies a range of constitutions (1288b21–35): not only the ideal constitution, but also inferior systems.

“For it is probably impossible for many persons to attain the best constitution, so that the legislator and true statesman must overlook neither the best constitution without qualification nor the best under the circumstances” (1288b24–7). The legislator must be acquainted with three sorts of constitution: first, the best without qualification, that is, “most according to our prayers with no external impediment” (1288b23–4); second, the best under the circumstances for a given population; third, the constitution that serves the aim a given city-state population happens to have that is best based on a hypothesis: or ought to be able to study a given constitution, both how it might originally come to be, and, when it has come to be, in what manner it might be preserved for the longest time; I mean, for example, if a particular city happens neither to be governed by the best constitution, nor to be equipped even with necessary things, nor to be the possible under existing circumstances, but to be a baser sort.

(1288b28–33) This passage has been interpreted in very different ways: Some view Aristotle as endorsing “Machiavellian realism,” with the political scientist as a “hired consultant” equipped with “political mechanics employed perhaps for an inferior or even a bad end” (Barker 1931, 164; Irwin 1985, 155).

Others note Aristotle’s emphasis on constitutional reform ( Pol. IV.1.1289a3–4) and argue that “constitutional reform presupposes a political ideal” (Keyt 1999, xv; F. Miller 1995, 183–90). Aristotle chides earlier theorists (including Plato no doubt) for fixating on ideal theory and neglecting practical necessity.

The legislator/statesman should try to establish “a constitutional order that people will be easily persuaded to accept and able to participate in,” since reforming a constitution is no less a task than setting one up in the first place ( Pol. IV.1.1288b35–1289a7). This requires a thorough knowledge of constitutions: what kinds there are, how many there are, how they can be combined with each other.

“It is with this same practical wisdom that one knows the laws that are best and those that are suited to each constitution. So grasping the varieties and the number of each type of constitution is clearly necessary also for laying down laws” (IV.1.1289a13–22).

Aristotle distinguishes between correct constitutions, which promote the common advantage, from deviant constitutions, which promote the advantage of the rulers, and combines this with the observation that the ruling class may consist of one person, a few, or a multitude. Hence, there are six basic constitutional forms ( Pol.

III.7):

One ruler Kingship Tyranny
Few rulers Aristocracy Oligarchy
Many rulers Polity Democracy

The correct constitutions are just and according to nature, and the incorrect constitutions are unjust and unnatural ( Pol. III.6.1279a18–20, 17.1287b36–41). And since the laws are subordinate to the constitution, “the laws conforming to correct constitutions must be just, but those conforming to deviant constitutions must be unjust” (III.11.1282b10–13).

The above sixfold schema is only the starting point for Aristotle’s classification of constitutions, because there are many varieties of each type. A large democracy like Athens might include wealthy landed aristocrats, farmers, craftsmen, merchants, sailors, fishermen, and manual laborers. The character of the democracy would depend upon the relative power of these different classes (IV.3.1290a8).

Aristotle distinguishes a range of democratic constitutions that might arise, from a moderate form with a modest property qualification (excluding the “baser” sort of citizen) to an extreme form, which included all freeborn persons no matter how poor and uneducated who were susceptible to demagoguery (IV.4.1291b14–1292a13).

  • In general, “the legislator and statesman ought to know what democratic measures save and what destroy a democracy, and what oligarchic measures save or destroy an oligarchy” ( Pol.V.9.1309b35).
  • This requires knowledge of the different sorts of constitutions and how these can be combined to become “mixed” constitutions of various sorts ( Pol.

IV–VI). Aristotle’s view is, again, open to different interpretations: Should legislators try to bring about genuine reform, making actual democracies or oligarchies more like the ideal constitution? Or should they strive for quasi-reform, making them more stable and viable constitutions of their type, even if they are not more just? In any case, the legislator for the best constitution must possess broad knowledge of human cultures and be able to adapt the laws to variable social contexts: “he excellent legislator should observe how a city-state or race of men or any other community may participate in a good life and in the happiness that is possible for them.” For example, in the case of military affairs, the legislator must obviously take into account the actual threats faced by the city-state: “There will be differences, however, in the statutes that are enacted; and if there are neighbors, legislative science has the task of seeing what sorts of training are needed in relation to what sorts of people, and which measures should be adopted in relation to each sort” ( Pol.

  1. VII.2.1325a7–14).
  2. But, as an overriding objective, “the legislator should be more serious about arranging military regulations and other legislation for the sake of leisure and peace” (VII.14.1334a3–5).
  3. Aristotle discusses two distinct but interrelated applications of legislation: laying down laws and educating the citizens (VII.14.1333b9).

Let us consider these in turn. The statutes and customs regulate all aspects of conduct, including marriage and family relations, contracts, property, voluntary transactions, and torts; but the most important of these concern the distribution of political power within the city-state.

  • Aristotle argues that every constitution contains three elements: deliberative (e.g., the popular assembly), adjudicative (e.g., jury courts), and offices (e.g., treasurers, wardens, and auditors).
  • The excellent legislator must consider which of these is advantageous for each constitution (IV.14.1297b38).

These elements can take very different forms; for example, all the citizens have a right to deliberate (e.g., extreme democracies), or only some may be permitted to deliberate (e.g., oligarchies), or all of them may deliberate about some things (e.g., whether to pass a decree), but not about others (e.g., determining whether a decree is legal), as in moderate democracies and polities.

  • Aristotle provides ( Pol.
  • IV.14–16) a systematic and almost exhaustive account of the different “modes” or ways these matters are handled; for example, which persons are eligible for office, how are they selected, in what manner, etc.? This systematic and almost exhaustive inventory of modes is the fruit of Aristotle’s extensive empirical study of existing city-states.

Drawing on such knowledge, the legislator can fashion appropriate statutes for each constitution. Education is the other major concern of legislative science. For the legislator has not completed his job by merely laying down good laws. As the unfortunate example of Solon shows, the citizens may not be disposed to obey the laws.

  • Threats of punishment are not in Aristotle’s view a sufficient guarantee that the citizens and officials will support the constitution and laws (see Pol,
  • IV.5.1292b11–17).
  • The laws themselves thus must have an educative function: “Whoever wants to make people, whether many or few, better by his care must try to become capable of legislating, if it is through laws that we can become good” ( EN X.9.1180b23–5).

Aristotle argues as follows: Rational moral arguments involve an appeal to goodness or nobility. People will be motivated only by pleasure or pain unless their souls have first been cultivated “like earth which is to nourish seed,” that is, unless they have been taught by habit to love the good and noble and to hate the evil and base (1179b25–6).

They will come to recognize the inherent value of virtue only by performing virtuous actions repeatedly, so that they acquire the habit of acting virtuously. Hence, they will not respond to rational moral arguments unless they have first been morally habituated. Further, those who have not yet been morally habituated will only respond to “compulsive power,” which commands have only when they are backed by the law (1180a21).

Therefore, people can be morally educated only if they are habituated under the laws. Because legislative science has an important pedagogical function, Aristotle devotes over half of his discussion of the ideal constitution to its educational system ( Pol.

  • VII–VIII).
  • The legislator must be knowledgeable of human nature and cognizant of the diversities of human lives and actions as he designs a system of education that will promote the development of the citizens’ bodies and souls (VII.14.1333a37–41, 15.1334b6–28).
  • There must be a detailed program of prenatal and infant care, physical education, and liberal education, including letters, mathematics, and music.

The educational system must be public in view of the fact that the citizens have a single common end, the life of moral virtue, which can be achieved only if every citizen is educated (VII.13.1332a31–6; VIII.1.1337a21–6). But education in civic virtue is also necessary for deviant constitutions.

  • The most beneficial laws, even though they are ratified by everyone in the government, will be of no benefit, unless the people are habituated and educated in the constitution, democratically, if the laws are democratic, and oligarchically, if the laws are oligarchic” ( Pol.V.9.1310a14–18).
  • Even when there is not a system of public education, private citizens should undertake to educate their children and friends, and they will do so more effectively if they are capable of legislating.

“For it is clear that public care comes about through laws, and reasonable care through excellent laws. And it would seem to make no difference whether the laws are written or unwritten, nor whether an individual or many persons are educated through them” ( EN Only gold members can continue reading.

What is general and special law?

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence April 1948 – Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions SECOND DIVISION ROSARIO VALERA, assisted by her husband, Juan Valera, Petitioner, v. MARIANO TUASON, Jr., Justice of the Peace of Lagayan, Abra, MANUEL TULLAS ET AL., Respondents-Appellees, THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL, Intervenor-Appellee, Marcelino N. Sayo, for Petitioner-Appellant,

Etelboldo Valera, for Respondents-Appellees Tullas Et. Al. The justice of the peace in his own behalf, SYLLABUS 1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PROVISIONS OF A LAW OR OF TWO LAWS TO BE HARMONIZED; IMPLIED REPEAL. — Endeavor should be made to harmonize the provisions of a law or of two laws so that each shall be effective.

In order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act. (U.S.v. Palacios, 33 Phil., 208.) Merely because a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the new law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one.

  • Statutory Construction, Crawford, p.634.) 2.
  • ID.; ID.; ID.; JUSTICE OF THE PEACE; DISQUALIFICATION; TRANSFER OF CASE TO NEAREST JUSTICE OF THE PEACE; SECTION 73 OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND SECTION 211 OF REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE BOTH IN FORCE.
  • By a fair and reasonable construction, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, may be said to apply to disqualifications under section 8 of that Act, and section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code to disqualifications or disabilities not embraced in the Code of Civil Procedure.

Both provisions can stand together.3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL LAW WHEN REPEALED BY GENERAL LAW; SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER GENERAL LAW; GENERAL LAW AND SPECIAL LAW DEFINED. — A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest.

  1. Generalia specialibus non derogant.
  2. And this is true although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter in the special statute.
  3. Manila Railroad Company v.
  4. Rafferty, 40 Phil., 224.) At any rate, in the event harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute, considered in its entirely, indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature.

Granting then that the two laws can not be reconciled, in so far as they are inconsistent with each other, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being a specific law, should prevail over, or be considered as an exception to section 211 of the Administrative Code, which is a provision of general character.

  • A general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class, while a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class.
  • Statutory Construction, Crawford, p.265.) 4.
  • ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 73 OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE NOT REPEALED OR ABSORBED BY RULES OF COURT.

– There is less reason to hold that section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been impliedly repealed or absorbed by the Rules of Court than that it has been abrogated by section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code; for the authority of a judge to try a case is a matter of substantive law, not embraced by the purposes and scope of the Rules of Court which concern “pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines, and the admission to the practice of law therein.” (Introductory section of the Rules of Court.) D E C I S I O N TUASON, J.

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra dismissing a petition for certiorari,
  2. It results that a complaint for forcible entry was filed in the justice of the peace court of Lagayan over which Judge Federico Paredes presided.
  3. Finding himself disqualified, by reason of relationship to one of the parties, to try the case, Judge Paredes transferred it to the justice of the peace of La Paz, the nearest municipality to Lagayan.

The latter justice of the peace, over the objection of the attorney for the defendants, proceeded with the trial, after which he gave judgment for the plaintiff and returned the record of the case with his decision to the justice of the peace of Lagayan.

  • In the meantime, a new justice of the peace had been appointed for Lagayan — Mariano B.
  • Tuason, one of the respondents in the petition for certiorari,
  • After the case was received in the court of the justice of the peace of Lagayan, the defendants moved for a new trial impeaching the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace of La Paz.

The new justice of the peace of Lagayan found the challenge well founded, declared the judgment null and void, and ordered the case reset for hearing before him. The Lagayan justice’s ground for unvalidating the decision of the justice of the peace of La Paz is that “the designation of another justice of the peace to hear, try and decide a given case, when the justice having jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the same disqualifies himself, is not in law given to the disqualifying justice but ‘to the judge of the district’ who ‘shall designate the nearest justice of the peace.’ (Section 211, Rev.

  1. Adm. Code).” He believes that the circular of the Secretary of Justice of January 17, 1940, in pursuance of which the case was transferred, is legally wrong.
  2. The circular states that “when a justice of the peace is merely disqualified to try a certain case, he should transmit, without notifying the district judge, the record thereof to the justice of the peace of the nearest municipality in accordance with section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” ) The annulment by the newly-appointed justice of the peace of Lagayan of the proceedings before the justice of the peace of La Paz and the latter’s decision was sustained on appeal by Honorable Patricio Ceniza, Judge of the Court of First Instance, but on a different ground.

Judge Ceniza does not agree that section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code has repealed section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.190.) He is of the opinion that it is the new Rules of Court which have abrogated the last-named section. Section 73 of Act No.190 as amended provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library In every case, whether civil or criminal, of disqualification of a justice of the peace upon any ground mentioned in section eight of this Act, the regular justice shall notify the auxilliary, who shall thereupon appear and try the cause, unless he shall be likewise disqualified or otherwise disabled, in which event the cause shall be transferred to the nearest justice of the peace of the province who is not disqualified.

  1. Section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Auxilliary justice — Qualifications and duties.
  2. The auxilliary justice of the peace shall have the same qualifications and be subject to the same restrictions as the regular justice, and shall perform the duties of said office during any vacancy therein or in case of the absence of the regular justice from the municipality, or of his disability or disqualification, or in case of his death or resignation until the appointment and qualification of his successor, or in any cause whose immediate trial the regular justice shall certify to be specially urgent and which he is unable to try by reason of actual engagement in another trial.

In case there is no auxilliary justice of the peace to perform the duties of the regular justice in the cases above mentioned, the judge of the district shall designate the nearest justice of the peace of the province to act as justice of the peace in such municipality, town, or place, in which case the justice of the peace so designated shall have jurisdiction and shall receive the total of his own salary and seventy-five per centum of the salary of the justice of the peace whom he may substitute.

One of the well-established rules of statutory construction enjoins that endeavor should be made to harmonize the provisions of a law or of two laws so that each shall be effective. In order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act.

(U.S.v. Palacios, 33 Phil., 208.) Merely because a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the new law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one.

  1. Statutory Construction, Crawford, p.634.) The above-quoted provisions can stand together.
  2. By a fair and reasonable construction, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, may be said to apply to disqualifications under section 8 of that Act, and section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code to disqualifications or disabilities not embraced in the Code of Civil Procedure.

From another angle the presumption against repeal is stronger. A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest. Generalia specialibus non derogant. And this is true although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter in the special statute.

Manila Railroad Company v. Rafferty, 40 Phil., 224.) At any rate, in the event harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute, considered in its entirety, indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature.

Granting then that the two laws can not be reconciled, in so far as they are inconsistent with each other, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being a specific law, should prevail over, or be considered as an exception to, section 211 of the Administrative Code, which is a provision of general character.

A general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class, while a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class. (Statutory Construction, Crawford, p.265.) But the history of the two laws gives positive indication that they were designed to complement each other.

This history reveals that the two enactments have different origins, one independent of the other, and have been intended to operate side by side. This intent is apparent from the fact that, in their respective process of evolution, they, at one time, in Act No.1627, met and were lodged in adjoining sections — 7 and 8 — each maintaining a separate and independent identity; and while, later, section 7 of Act No.1627 was amended by section 3 of Act No.1741, section 8 was given a different direction by being amended by another law, section 1 of Act 1888.

  1. We further note that the final section of the Administrative Code expressly repealed section 7 of Act 1627 and the entire Act 1741 but made no reference whatever to section 73 of Act 190, section 8 of Act 1627, or section 1 of Act 1888.
  2. The purpose to keep both laws in force and subsisting can find no clearer proof than this unless it be an express declaration of intention.

For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, Judge Ceniza’s opinion that the Rules of Court have replaced and absorbed section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure is clearly erroneous. It may be said that there is less reason to hold that this section has been impliedly repealed by the Rules of Court than that it has been abrogated by section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code; for the authority of a judge to try a case is a matter of substantive law, not embraced by the purposes and scope of the Rules of Court, which concern “pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines, and the admission to the practice of law therein.” (Introductory section of the Rules of Court.) Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed with costs against the appellee.