Warren Norred

Where Should I Hide During Martial Law?

• Marvin Harvey
• 20.12.2022
• 0
• 36

Option 1: Rural Town – Heading to a rural town as often seen as the best option for dealing with martial law. It is true that rural towns have much to recommend them Depending on the scope and breadth of martial law that has been declared, they might even be completely untouched and relatively unwatched compared to larger, more important settlements.

1. If you already live in a small town, your best bet might be to simply stay put.
2. Chances are you will know many of the residents and they will know you.
3. Rural towns are often nominally more self-sufficient when it comes to survival essentials like food, water and meaningful shelter than larger cities.
4. Many of the people living in rural communities live a lifestyle that is more in line with self-sufficiency and personal preparedness, and all that adds up to a more survivable community when times get tough.

It also helps there are usually many ways in and out of rural communities, both on the map and not. But consider this. If you don’t already live in one of these places and think you are just going to head into one and set up camp during times of trouble consider that you might rightly be viewed as an outsider and with considerable suspicion.

1. It is also worth mentioning that serious military forces taking action to reduce insurgent and subversive efforts may still be watching these small watering holes and taking notes accordingly, at least along major thoroughfares in and out.
2. But, even in the event that a rural town itself is directly under martial law it is unlikely to see heavy deployments of troops and vehicles.

Especially if the town is simply trying to get along as it always has it is unlikely to fall under a heavy boot. However, this can also work against people trying to go incognito because it will be far, far harder to blend into the wider populace because it is so small.

What is the safest place during martial law?

Abandoned Locations – When civil authority is no longer recognized and the federal government (or any government) brings in the military to regain control of an area, the situation can go from bad to worse in short order. If you can’t leave the area, you need to act quickly because violence can and most likely will happen, especially if large crowds are involved.

What happens to citizens during martial law?

Use – Martial law can be used by governments to enforce their rule over the public, as seen in multiple countries listed below. Such incidents may occur after a coup d’état ( Thailand in 2006 and 2014, and Egypt in 2013 ); when threatened by popular protest (China, Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 ); to suppress political opposition ( martial law in Poland in 1981 ); or to stabilize insurrections or perceived insurrections.

Martial law may be declared in cases of major natural disasters; however, most countries use a different legal construct, such as a state of emergency, Martial law has also been imposed during conflicts, and in cases of occupations, where the absence of any other civil government provides for an unstable population.

Examples of this form of military rule include post World War II reconstruction in Germany and Japan, the recovery and reconstruction of the former Confederate States of America during Reconstruction Era in the United States of America following the American Civil War, and German occupation of northern France between 1871 and 1873 after the Treaty of Frankfurt ended the Franco-Prussian War,

What is a good example of martial law?

Martial law in the United States refers to times in United States history in which in a region, state, city, or the whole United States was placed under the control of a military body. On a national level, both the US President and the US Congress have the power, within certain constraints, to impose martial law since both can be in charge of the militia.

Who is president during martial law?

The Sunday edition of the Philippines Daily Express on September 24, 1972, the only newspaper published after the announcement of martial law on September 21, the evening prior. At 7:17 pm on September 23, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos announced on television that he had placed the entirety of the Philippines under martial law,

This marked the beginning of a 14-year period of one-man rule that would effectively last until Marcos was exiled from the country on February 25, 1986. Even though the formal document proclaiming martial law – Proclamation No.1081, which was dated September 21, 1972 – was formally lifted on January 17, 1981, Marcos retained essentially all of his powers as dictator until he was ousted.

While the period of Philippine history in which Marcos was in power actually began seven years earlier, when he was first inaugurated president of the Philippines in late 1965, this article deals specifically with the period where he exercised dictatorial powers under martial law, and the period in which he continued to wield those powers despite technically lifting the proclamation of martial law in 1981.

When he declared martial law in 1972, Marcos claimed that he had done so in response to the “communist threat” posed by the newly founded Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), and the sectarian “rebellion” of the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM). Opposition figures of the time, such as Lorenzo Tañada, Jose W.

Diokno, and Jovito Salonga, accused Marcos of exaggerating these threats, using them as a convenient excuse to consolidate power and extend his tenure beyond the two presidential terms allowed by the 1935 constitution. After Marcos was ousted, government investigators discovered that the declaration of martial law had also allowed the Marcoses to hide secret stashes of unexplained wealth that various courts later determined to be “of criminal origin”.

This 14-year period in Philippine history is remembered for the administration’s record of human rights abuses, particularly targeting political opponents, student activists, journalists, religious workers, farmers, and others who fought against the Marcos dictatorship, Based on the documentation of Amnesty International, Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, and similar human rights monitoring entities, historians believe that the Marcos dictatorship was marked by 3,257 known extrajudicial killings, 35,000 documented tortures, 77 ‘disappeared’, and 70,000 incarcerations.

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Can the government take your guns during martial law?

Can the Government Take Your Guns? – Even in times of crisis, it is still ILLEGAL for the government to confiscate weapons from law-abiding citizens. The Constitution can’t just be put on hold because of a threat. However, that doesn’t mean firearm confiscation hasn’t happened (or won’t happen again).

As John Whitehead at Medium put it, If the government is consistent about any one thing, it is this: it has an unnerving tendency to exploit crises and use them as opportunities for power grabs under the guise of national security. Take what happened during Hurricane Katrina. Soldiers were sent out to confiscate firearms without a warrant.

Patricia Konie, a resident of New Orleans, was one of the victims of this illegal confiscation. She had emergency supplies stockpiled in her home, including a revolver for personal protection. When she refused to turn it over to the soldiers who came to confiscate it, she was attacked, had her shoulder fractured, and was taken into custody.

You can see the video of Konie’s ordeal here, It’s worth noting that the Disaster Recovery Personal Protection Act was passed after the Katrina debacle. The law prevents the confiscation of firearms during a disaster. Yet, guns did get seized during Hurricane Irma in the US Virgin Islands, Obviously, the “legality” of things goes out the window in the chaos of a natural disaster.

But now we’ve got Red Flag laws that allow officials to confiscate weapons from citizens who “pose a grave risk to public safety.” already, 17 states have these laws, and the number is growing.

Is it possible to have martial law in the Philippines?

This article is about several periods of martial law in the Philippines. For Ferdinand Marcos’ declaration of martial law, see Proclamation No.1081, For Rodrigo Duterte’s declaration of martial law in Mindanao, see Proclamation No.216, Martial law in the Philippines ( Filipino : Batas Militar sa Pilipinas ) refers to the various historical instances in which the Philippine head of state placed all or part of the country under military control – most prominently : 111  during the administration of Ferdinand Marcos, but also during the Philippines’ colonial period, during the second world war, and more recently on the island of Mindanao during the administrations of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Rodrigo Duterte,

The alternative term ” Martial Law Era ” as applied to the Philippines is typically used to describe the Marcos martial law period specifically. Martial law has historically been implemented through the Armed Forces of the Philippines and its predecessor bodies, serving as the head of state’s primary tool for implementing political power in a reversal of the normal practice of civilian control of the military,

Under the current Constitution of the Philippines, the President, as head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces, may declare Martial Law “in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.” Most countries use a different legal construct like ” state of emergency “.

Are rights suspended during martial law?

The anniversary of the declaration of martial law is on September 23 (not September 21) “FM Declares Martial Law”—the headline of the September 24, 1972 issue of the Sunday Express, which was the Sunday edition of Philippines Daily Express. The Daily Express was the only newspaper allowed to circulate upon the declaration of Martial Law President Ferdinand E.

• Marcos signed Proclamation No.1081 on September 21, 1972, placing the Philippines under Martial Law.
• Some sources say that Marcos signed the proclamation on September 17 or on September 22—but, in either case, the document itself was dated September 21.
• Throughout the Martial Law period, Marcos built up the cult of September 21, proclaiming it as National Thanksgiving Day by virtue of Proclamation No.1180 s.1973 to memorialize the date as the foundation day of his New Society.

The propaganda effort was so successful that up to the present, many Filipinos—particularly those who did not live through the events of September 23, 1972—labor under the misapprehension that martial law was proclaimed on September 21, 1972. It was not.

The culmination of a long period of preparation The facts are clear. A week before the actual declaration of Martial Law, a number of people had already received information that Marcos had drawn up a plan to completely take over the government and gain absolute rule. Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr., during a September 13, 1972 privilege speech, exposed what was known as “Oplan Sagittarius.” The Senator said he had received a top-secret military plan given by Marcos himself to place Metro Manila and outlying areas under the control of the Philippine Constabulary as a prelude to Martial Law.

Marcos was going to use a series of bombings in Metro Manila, including the 1971 Plaza Miranda bombing, as a justification for his takeover and subsequent authoritarian rule. In his own diary, Marcos wrote on September 14, 1972 that he informed the military that he would proceed with proclaiming Martial Law.

1. Even the U.S.
2. Embassy in Manila knew as early as September 17, 1972 about Marcos’ plan.
3. This was indeed the culmination of a long period of preparation: As early as May 17, 1969, Marcos hinted the declaration of Martial Law, when he addressed the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Association : One of my favorite mental exercises, which others may find useful, is to foresee possible problems one may have to face in the future and to determine what solutions can possibly be made to meet these problems.

For instance, if I were suddenly asked, to pose a given situation, to decide in five minutes when and where to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, I have decided that there should be at least five questions that I would ask, and depending on the answers to these five questions, I would know when and where to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The same thing is true with the declaration of martial law It is a useful mental exercise to meet a problem before it happens. In his memoir, then Justice Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile recalled that on a late afternoon in December 1969, Marcos instructed him to study the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief under the provisions of the 1935 Constitution,

Marcos made this instruction as he ” an escalation of violence and disorder in the country and to know the extent of his powers as commander-in-chief.” The President also stressed that “the study must be done discreetly and confidentially.” At about the same time, Marcos also instructed Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor and Jose Almonte to study how Martial Law was implemented in different parts of the world.

Marcos also wanted to know the consequences of declaring Martial Law. The result of their study stated that, “while Martial Law may accelerate development, in the end the Philippines would become a political archipelago, with debilitating, factionalized politics.” Almonte recalled that their findings led to the conclusion that “the nation would be destroyed because, apart from the divisiveness it would cause, Martial Law would offer Marcos absolute power which would corrupt absolutely.” By the end of January 1970, Enrile, with the help of Efren Plana and Minerva Gonzaga Reyes, submitted the only copy of the confidential report on the legal nature and extent of Martial Law to Marcos.

A week later, Marcos summoned Enrile and instructed him to prepare the documents to implement Martial Law in the Philippines. In his January 1971 diary entries, Marcos discussed how he met with business leaders, intellectuals from the University of the Philippines, and the military to lay the groundwork that extreme measures would be needed in the future.

On May 8, 1972, Marcos confided in his diary that he had instructed the military to update its plans, including the list of personalities to be arrested, and had met with Enrile to finalize the legal paperwork required. On August 1, 1972, Marcos met with Enrile and a few of his most trusted military commanders to discuss tentative dates for the declaration of Martial Law—to fall within the next two months.

All of the dates they considered either ended in seven or were divisible by seven, as Marcos considered seven his lucky number. The last days of democracy Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr. delivers a privilege speech on the Senate floor on September 21, 1972—two days before Martial Law was declared and implemented. (From A Garrison State in the Make, p.353) On September 21, 1972, democracy was still functioning in the Philippines.

• Senator Benigno S.
• Aquino Jr.
• Was still able to deliver a privilege speech—what would be his final one—in the Senate.
• Primitivo Mijares, among others, recounted the functioning of the House of Representatives and the Senate, with committee meetings scheduled for that night.
• Senate and House leaders agreed not to adjourn on this day, as earlier scheduled.

They decided to extend their special session to a sine die adjournment on September 23. That afternoon, a protest march in Plaza Miranda was sponsored by the Concerned Christians for Civil Liberties. The rally was attended by more than 30 “civic, religious, labor, student, and activist groups a crowd of 30,000,” and received coverage from newspapers, radio, and television. A mass rally organized by the Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL) was held at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo. (Photo courtesy of Philippines Free Press Magazine) In his diary, Marcos wrote that he, together with members of his Cabinet and staff, finished the preparation of Proclamation 1081 at 8 PM, September 21.

On September 22, 1972, a day after the final speech of Ninoy Aquino, newspapers still came out: they featured the rally held the previous day in Plaza Miranda. Mijares recounted that Marcos was agitated by a statement reported in the Daily Express that if Martial Law were declared, Aquino said he would have to be arrested soon after or he would escape to join the resistance.

The Enrile ambush as pretext for Martial Law The pretext for Martial Law was provided later in the evening of Friday, September 22, 1972, the convoy of Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile was ambushed in Wack-Wack as he was on his way home to Dasmariñas Village in Makati before 9 p.m.

Enrile recalled his convoy was driving out of Camp Aguinaldo when a car opened fire at his convoy and sped away. A contrasting account came from Oscar Lopez, who lived along Notre Dame Street, Wack Wack Village, stated that he heard a lot of shooting and that when he went out to see what was happening, he saw an empty car riddled with bullets.

Lopez’s driver, who happened to see the incident, narrated that “there was a car that came and stopped beside a Meralco post. Some people got out of the car, and then there was another car that came by beside it and started riddling it with bullets to make it look like it was ambushed.” This ambush, as Enrile later revealed in 1986, was staged by Marcos to justify Martial Law. Excerpt from the diary of Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 22, 1972. From the Philippine Diary Project, Marcos, in his diary entry for September 22, 1972 (time-stamped 9:55 p.m.) wrote, “Sec. Juan Ponce Enrile was ambushed near Wack-Wack at about 8:00 pm tonight.

1. It was a good thing he was riding in his security car as a protective measure This makes the martial law proclamation a necessity.” His diary entry for September 25, 1972 mentions conditions after two days of Martial Law, also indicating martial law in reality is dated to September 23, 1972.
2. Primitivo Mijares—a former journalist for Marcos who would later write against Marcos and disappear without a trace in 1973—claimed that the Enrile ambush was fake as it was made as the final excuse for Marcos to declare Martial Law.

Mijares also claimed that the ammunition planted by the Presidential Guard Battalion in Digoyo Point, Isabela—which was later confiscated by the Philippine Constabulary on July 5, 1972—was used to connect the ambush with alleged Communist terror attacks.

In the biography of Chino Roces, Vergel Santos questioned the elements of the Enrile ambush: “Why inside a village and not on a public street, and why in that particular village? Possibly for easier stage-managing: the family of Enrile’s sister Irma and her husband, Dr. Victor Potenciano, lived there, in Fordham, the next street in the Potenciano home and got the story straight from him, as officially scripted.” September 21 or September 23? When Marcos appeared on television at 7:15 p.m.

on September 23, 1972 to announce that he had placed the “entire Philippines under Martial Law” by virtue of Proclamation No.1081, he framed his announcement in legalistic terms that were untrue. This helped camouflage the true nature of his act to this day: it was nothing less than a self-coup.

Marcos announced that he had placed the entire country under Martial Law as of 9 p.m. on September 22, 1972 via a proclamation which, he claimed, he’d signed on September 21, 1972. Yet accounts differ. David Rosenberg, writing in the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (“The End of the Freest Press in the World,” Vol.5, 1973) chronicled that about six hours after the ambush, Marcos signed Proclamation No.1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law, placing the signing at around 3 a.m.

on September 23. Raymond Bonner, in his book Waltzing with the Dictator, narrated his interview with Enrile, during which the former Defense Secretary recalled that he and Acting Executive Secretary Roberto Reyes witnessed Marcos sign Proclamation No.1081 in the morning of September 23, 1972.

1. The Bangkok Post asserted in a series of articles called “The Aquino Papers,” published from February 20 to 22 of 1973, that Proclamation No.1081 had been signed even earlier, on September 17, 1972, postdated to September 21.
2. Mijares also mentioned in his book that Marcos said as much in an address to a conference of historians, in January 1973.

Two things emerge: first, whether they conflict or not, all accounts indicate that Marcos’ obsession with numerology (particularly the number seven) necessitated that Proclamation No.1081 be officially signed on a date that was divisible by seven. Thus, September 21, 1972 became the official date that Martial Law was established and the day that the Marcos dictatorship began.

1. This also allowed Marcos to control history on his own terms.
2. Day one of the Marcos dictatorship The second is that the arbitrary date emphasizes that the actual date for Martial Law was not the numerologically-auspicious (for Marcos) 21st, but rather, the moment that Martial Law was put into full effect, which was after the nationwide address of Ferdinand Marcos as far as the nation was concerned: September 23, 1972.

By then, personalities considered threats to Marcos (Senators Benigno S. Aquino Jr., Jose Diokno, Francisco Rodrigo and Ramon Mitra Jr., and members of the media such as Joaquin Roces, Teodoro Locsin Sr., Maximo Soliven and Amando Doronila) had already been rounded up, starting with the arrest of Senator Aquino at midnight on September 22, and going into the early morning hours of September 23, when 100 of the 400 personalities targeted for arrest were already detained in Camp Crame by 4 a.m.

1. In the meantime, the military had shut down mass media, flights were canceled, and incoming overseas calls were prohibited.
2. Press Secretary Francisco Tatad went on air at 3 p.m.
3. Of September 23 to read the text of Proclamation No.1081.
4. The reading of the proclamation was followed by Marcos going on air at 7:15 p.m.

to justify the massive clampdown of democratic institutions in the country. Marcos would subsequently issue General Order No.1, s.1972, transferring all powers to the President who was to rule by decree. The New York Times reported about these events in an article titled “Mass Arrests and Curfew Announced in Philippines; Mass Arrests Ordered in Philippines” in their September 24, 1972 issue.

The Daily Express itself announced in its September 24 issue that Marcos had proclaimed martial law the day before, September 23, 1972. “Never again” After the declaration and imposition of Martial Law, citizens would still go on to challenge the constitutionality of Proclamation No.1081. Those arrested filed petitions for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court.

But Marcos, who had originally announced that Martial Law would not supersede the 1935 Constitution, engineered the replacement of the constitution with a new one. On March 31, 1973, the Supreme Court issued its final decision in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, which essentially validated the 1973 Constitution.

• This would be the final legitimizing decision with on the constitutionality of Martial Law: in G.R. No.
• L-35546 September 17, 1974, the Supreme Court dismissed petitions for habeas corpus by ruling that Martial Law was a political question beyond the jurisdiction of the court; and that, furthermore, the court had already deemed the 1973 Constitution in full force and effect, replacing the 1935 Constitution.

Martial Law would officially end on January 17, 1981 with Proclamation No.2045, Marcos, however, would reserve decree-making powers for himself. Today, the 1987 Constitution safeguards our institutions from a repeat of Marcos’ Martial Law regime. The Supreme Court is empowered to review all official acts to determine if there has been grave abuse of discretion.

Congress cannot be padlocked. Martial Law is limited in duration and effects, even if contemplated by a president. Section 18 of Article VII of the current Constitution provides: Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.

The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

• Bibliography Almonte, Jose T.
• And Marites Dañguilan Vitug, Endless Journey: A Memoir.
• Quezon City: Cleverheads Publishing, 2015.
• Bonner, Raymond, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy,
• New York: Times Books, 1987.
• Enrile, Juan Ponce, Juan Ponce Enrile: A Memoir,
• Quezon City, ABS-CBN Publishing Inc., 2012.

Hedman, Eva-Lotta E. and John Thayer Sidel, Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial Legacies, Post- Colonial Trajectories, London: Routledge, 2005. Mijares, Primitivo, The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos I,

1. New York: Union Square Publications, 1986.
2. Rodrigo, Raul, Phoenix: The Saga of the Lopez Family Volume 1: 1800 – 1972.
3. Manila: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, Inc., 2007.
4. Santos, Vergel O., Chino and His Time.
5. Pasig: Anvil, 2010.
6. Endnotes Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy (New York: Times Books, 1987), p.3.

Juan Ponce Enrile, Juan Ponce Enrile: A Memoir (Quezon City, ABS-CBN Publishing Inc., 2012), p.275. Juan Ponce Enrile, Juan Ponce Enrile: A Memoir (Quezon City, ABS-CBN Publishing Inc., 2012), p.275. Jose T. Almonte and Marites Dañguilan Vitug, Endless Journey: A Memoir (Quezon City: Cleverheads Publishing, 2015), p.77.

1. Juan Ponce Enrile, Juan Ponce Enrile: A Memoir, (Quezon City, ABS-CBN Publishing Inc., 2012), p.276.
2. Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy (New York: Times Books, 1987), p.95.
3. Primitivo Mijares, The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos I,

(New York: Union Square Publications, 1986), p.54. Eva-Lotta E. Hedman and John Thayer Sidel, Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial Legacies, Post- Colonial Trajectories (London: Routledge, 2005), p.129. Raul Rodrigo, Phoenix: The Saga of the Lopez Family Volume 1: 1800 – 1972, Manila: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, Inc., 2007), p.377 Primitivo Mijares, The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos I,

Who can call martial law?

Part I: What is Martial Law? – “Martial law” has no established definition. footnote1_am0q6r0 1 Duncan, 327 U.S. at 315 (“The term martial law carries no precise meaning.”). In the United States, however, the military’s domestic activities typically fall into one of three categories.

1. First, the armed forces sometimes assist civilian authorities with “non–law enforcement” functions.
2. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the military deployed helicopters along the Gulf Coast to carry out search-and-rescue missions that local governments were unable to do themselves.

Second, and far less frequently, the military assists civilian authorities with “law enforcement” activities. For example, state and federal troops were deployed to help police suppress the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Third, on some occasions, the military has taken the place of the civilian government.

This is what happened in Hawaii during World War II. Usually, but not always, the term “martial law” refers to the third category. It describes a power that, in an emergency, allows the military to push aside civilian authorities and exercise jurisdiction over the population of a particular area. Laws are enforced by soldiers rather than local police.

Policy decisions are made by military officers rather than elected officials. People accused of crimes are brought before military tribunals rather than ordinary civilian courts. In short, the military is in charge. footnote2_5dtbtho 2 William C. Banks and Stephen Dycus, Soldiers on the Home Front: The Domestic Role of the American Military (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 198; John Fabian Witt, “A Lost Theory of American Emergency Constitutionalism,” Law and History Review 36 (August 2018): 581–83; Stephen I.

Vladeck, “The Field Theory: Martial Law, the Suspension Power, and the Insurrection Act,” Temple Law Review 80 (Summer 2007): 391–439; Stephen I. Vladeck, “Emergency Power and the Militia Acts,” Yale Law Journal 114 (Fall 2004): 149, 162; and George M. Dennison, “Martial Law: The Development of a Theory of Emergency Powers, 1776–1861,” American Journal of Legal History 18 (January 1974): 61.

This is a dramatic departure from normal practice in the United States. The U.S. military, when allowed to act domestically at all, is ordinarily limited to assisting civilian authorities. Martial law turns that relationship on its head. The displacement of civilian government distinguishes it from other emergency powers, such as the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

• Suspending the writ allows the government to detain and hold individuals without charge but does not imply any unusual role for the armed forces.
• While a declaration of martial law might be accompanied by a suspension of habeas corpus, they are distinct concepts.
• Martial law has not always meant what it does today.

The term first appeared in England in the 1530s during the reign of King Henry VIII. footnote3_0oiy0w8 3 John M. Collins, Martial Law and English Laws, c.1500–c.1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 27. At that time and for centuries afterward, martial law generally referred to what is now called “military law.” footnote4_yhndtj9 4 Collins, Martial Law and English Laws, 3–7; and Dennison, “Martial Law,” 52.

• This is the law that applies when a soldier is court-martialed.
• In the modern United States, it is codified in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
• Footnote5_3jiqh6q 5 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat.109, 10 U.S.C.
• §§ 801–946.U.S.
• Law did not recognize martial law as an emergency power until the mid-19th century.

Before that time, the idea of allowing military rule in an emergency was considered outrageous — as evidenced by the national reaction to the first declaration of martial law in U.S. history. In December 1814, toward the end of the War of 1812, Gen. Andrew Jackson led a small army in the defense of New Orleans against a much larger invading British force.

• As part of his defensive preparations, Jackson imposed martial law on the city.
• He censored the press, enforced a curfew, and detained numerous civilians without charge.
• Moreover, he continued military rule for more than two months after his famous victory at the Battle of New Orleans had ended any real threat from the British.

footnote6_0jhkz3a 6 Matthew Warshauer, Andrew Jackson and the Politics of Martial Law: Nationalism, Civil Liberties, and Partisanship (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2006), 19–46. Jackson argued that his actions were justified because the government in New Orleans had ceased to function as a result of the impending British attack, leaving the military as the only body able to protect the city.

1. In that situation, he claimed, the military had the authority to do anything that was “necessary” to preserve New Orleans.
2. Footnote7_ynrti80 7 Dennison, “Martial Law,” 61–62; and Vladeck, “Field Theory,” 422.
3. This was a novel argument, and it did little to explain why he kept the city under martial law for so long.

At the time, almost everyone rejected Jackson’s theory, which perhaps is unsurprising. The founding generation had been deeply suspicious of military power. That suspicion is apparent in the Declaration of Independence, which accuses King George III of rendering “the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power” — and in the Constitution, which pointedly divides the war powers between Congress and the president, and requires that the commander in chief always be a civilian.

1. Footnote8_76f6joq 8 Vladeck, “Emergency Power and the Militia Acts,” 156–58.
2. In an 1815 case, the Louisiana Supreme Court described Jackson’s conduct in New Orleans as “trampling upon the Constitution and laws of our country.” footnote9_3fjc5hg 9 Dennison, “Martial Law,” 64 (citing Johnson v.
3. Duncan et al.

Syndics, 1 Harr. Cond. Rep.157–70 ). Similarly, acting Secretary of War Alexander Dallas explained in a letter to Jackson that martial law had no legal existence in the United States outside of the Articles of War, the predecessor to the modern Uniform Code of Military Justice.

1. Footnote10_y9fq9uj 10 Dennison, “Martial Law,” 64 (citing Dallas to Jackson, 12 April, 1 July 1815, in John Spencer Bassett and J.
2. Franklin Jameson, eds., Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, vol.2, Andrew Jackson Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 1926–35, 203–4, 212–13).
3. Overall, the consensus in 1815 was that martial law was simply another term for military law, and that military jurisdiction could extend no further than the armed forces themselves.

After Jackson relinquished control of New Orleans back to its civilian government, the local federal district judge held him in contempt of court, fining him $1,000. Jackson paid the fine, and for the next 27 years, nothing more came of the incident. However, in the early 1840s, the now-aging former president orchestrated a campaign in Congress to refund him the cost of the fine, plus interest.

footnote11_dna0prk 11 Warshauer, Andrew Jackson and the Politics of Martial Law, 6–12. The ensuing congressional refund debates marked the beginning of a shift in how Americans understood martial law. By pursuing a refund, Jackson hoped to set a precedent for, as one historian put it, “the legitimacy of violating the Constitution and civil liberties in times of national emergency.” footnote12_1tztyah 12 Warshauer, Andrew Jackson and the Politics of Martial Law, 5–6.

He got exactly what he wanted. Congress enacted the refund bill in February 1844, symbolically endorsing Jackson’s three-month-long imposition of martial law in New Orleans almost 30 years after it had ended. footnote13_b8g8ysz 13 Act of February 16, 1844, ch.2, 5 Stat.651.

By this time, the United States’ second experience with martial law was already underway in Rhode Island. The so-called “Dorr War” involved a dispute over the state’s first constitution, which severely restricted the right to vote. In 1842, after efforts to reform this system had been rebuffed for years, a large group of Rhode Islanders led by Thomas Dorr organized its own constitutional convention, adopted a new constitution, held elections, and declared itself the true government of Rhode Island.

When Dorr rallied his supporters to assert their authority by force, the Rhode Island General Assembly declared martial law and called out the state militia to suppress the rebellion. footnote14_nuawwlm 14 Luther, 48 U.S. at 35–37; and Dennison, “Martial Law,” 68.

In 1849, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the legality of Rhode Island’s martial law declaration in Luther v. Borden, footnote15_1apogiu 15 Luther, 48 U.S. at 47. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roger Taney — of Dred Scott infamy — embraced Andrew Jackson’s idea that martial law allows civilians to be subjected to military jurisdiction in an emergency.

He described this power as an essential part of states’ right to defend themselves and suggested that it is inherent to all sovereign governments. footnote16_6ukrhm0 16 Luther, 48 U.S. at 45. By endorsing the constitutionality of martial law, the Supreme Court finished what Congress had started with the refund bill.

• The Luther decision makes clear that martial law exists as an emergency power that can be invoked in the United States, at least by state legislatures.
• Footnote17_f728xp4 17 Vladeck, “Field Theory,” 428–29; and Dennison, “Martial Law,” 76.
• But Luther also leaves many questions unanswered.
• It does not explain the legal basis for martial law, its scope, when it may be declared, or who is authorized to declare it.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has never directly held, in Luther or any subsequent case, that the federal government has the power to impose martial law. In one case, the Court suggested in “dicta”— a term for language in a judicial opinion that is not a necessary part of the holding and is not strictly legally binding — that the federal government may declare martial law.

1. Footnote18_u7jqc9f 18 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127.
2. It assumed the same in another case, but only for the purpose of deciding a narrower legal question.
3. Footnote19_wfxt1io 19 Duncan, 327 U.S. at 313.
4. Neither of those decisions conclusively affirms that a federal martial law power exists.
5. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never directly held, in Luther or any subsequent case, that the federal government has the power to impose martial law.

Over time, however, consistency of practice has papered over gaps in the legal theory. The United States made extensive use of martial law during the Civil War, imposing it on border states like Missouri and Kentucky where U.S. forces battled with Confederate insurgents.

footnote20_ljw12wo 20 Vladeck, “Emergency Power and the Militia Acts,” 175–83; and Banks and Dycus, Soldiers on the Home Front, 203–7. The Confederacy, too, relied on it heavily. footnote21_1a5ec65 21 Mark E. Neely Jr., Southern Rights: Political Prisoners and the Myth of Confederate Constitutionalism (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1999).

The practice did not end with the war: in the 90 years between the start of the Civil War and the end of World War II, martial law was declared at least 60 times. footnote22_466lgs7 22 Joseph Nunn, Guide to Declarations of Martial Law in the United States, Brennan Center for Justice, August 20, 2020.

What had been manifestly unconstitutional in the eyes of the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1815 had become a relatively ordinary part of American life by the end of the 19th century. States — and state governors in particular — have declared martial law far more often than the federal government. In the 1930s, Oklahoma Governor William “Alfalfa Bill” Murray declared martial law at least 6 and perhaps more than 30 times during his tenure.

footnote23_nhw4tpx 23 Debbie Jackson and Hilary Pittman, “Throwback Tulsa: Colorful ‘Alfalfa Bill’ Fell Short in Presidential Bid,” Tulsa World, July 14, 2016, https://www.tulsaworld.com/news/local/history/throwback-tulsa-colorful-alfalfa-bill-fell-short-in-presidential-bid/article_23b7bd2f-12ce-5415-a92f-937ecb40c0a6.html.

• City mayors and generals within states’ National Guard forces have also declared martial law on occasion.
• However, no state legislature has done so since the Rhode Island General Assembly in 1842.
• Not all of the military deployments under these declarations included what we today consider the defining feature of “martial law” — the displacement of civilian authority.

Many cases involved the use of the military to reinforce local police. In other cases, however, troops effectively replaced the police, and in some instances, they were used to impose the will of state or local officials rather than to enforce the law.

State officials have sometimes declared martial law in response to violent civil unrest or natural disasters, such as the Akron Riot of 1900 or the 1900 Galveston hurricane. footnote24_rjrskgq 24 Mary Plazo, “That Akron Riot,” Past Pursuits: A Newsletter of the Special Collections Division of the Akron-Summit County Public Library 9 (Summer 2010): 7, https://www.akronlibrary.org/images/Divisions/SpecCol/images/PastPursuits/pursuits92.pdf; and “Martial Law at an End: Conditions at Galveston Improving,” Los Angeles Herald, September 21, 1900, 2.

Far more often, however, they have used martial law to break labor strikes on behalf of business interests. For example, in September 1903, at the request of mine owners, Colorado Governor James Peabody declared martial law in Cripple Creek and Telluride to break a peaceful strike by the Western Federation of Miners.

1. The Colorado National Guard conducted mass arrests of striking workers and detained them in open-air bull pens.
2. The Guard even ignored state court orders to release the prisoners, with one officer declaring, “To hell with the constitution.” footnote25_73hxnr8 25 Elizabeth Jameson, All That Glitters—Class, Conflict, and Community in Cripple Creek (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 207–8.

States’ use of martial law continued well into the 20th century, reaching a peak in the 1930s — a decade that also saw an increase in the flagrant abuse of this power by governors. In 1933, for example, Georgia Governor Eugene Talmadge declared martial law “in and around” the headquarters building of the state Highway Board as part of a scheme to force out some of the board’s commissioners, whom he had no legal power to remove.

• This “coup de highway department” was ultimately successful.
• Remarkably, Talmadge’s successor, Governor Eurith Rivers, tried to do the same thing in 1939, but his attempt failed.
• Footnote26_120ucrm 26 “National Affairs: Martial Law,” Time, July 3, 1933, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,745726,00.html; and Miller v.

Rivers, 31 F. Supp.540 (M.D. Ga.1940), rev’d as moot, 112 F.2d 439 (5th Cir.1940). Misuses of martial law were not confined to Georgia. In 1931, Texas Governor Ross Sterling engaged in a standoff with the federal courts over his government’s ability to enforce a regulation limiting oil production by private well operators.

At the climax of the conflict, Sterling imposed martial law on several counties — despite the total absence of violence or threats of violence — and deployed the Texas National Guard to enforce the regulation. He declared that the federal courts had no power to review his decision. The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that “here is no such avenue of escape from the paramount authority of the Federal Constitution.” footnote27_ha95whs 27 Sterling, 287 U.S.

at 398, 403–4. It ordered Texas to stop using the military or any other means to enforce the regulation. The federal government has used martial law far less frequently than the states, imposing it only a few times since the end of Reconstruction. Generals have declared it more often than the president, such as in 1920, when U.S.

1. Army Gen. Francis C.
2. Marshall imposed martial law on Lexington, Kentucky, in order to suppress a lynch mob attempting to storm the courthouse.
3. Footnote28_ia4drxg 28 Peter Brackney, The Murder of Geneva Hardman and Lexington’s Mob Riot of 1920 (Charleston, SC: History Press, 2020), 97–98.
4. Most recently, the federal government declared martial law in Hawaii after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, which initiated three years of absolute military rule in the islands.

footnote29_nth9bsw 29 Scheiber and Scheiber, Bayonets in Paradise, As abruptly as it took hold in the mid-19 th century, martial law disappeared from American life after World War II. The federal government has not declared martial law since it restored civilian rule to Hawaii in 1944.

1. At the state level, martial law was last declared in 1963, when Maryland Governor J.
2. Millard Tawes imposed it on the city of Cambridge for more than a year in response to clashes between racial justice advocates and segregationists.
3. Footnote30_x1zdn84 30 Joseph R.
4. Fitzgerald, The Struggle Is Eternal: Gloria Richardson and Black Liberation (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2018), 121–29; Rebecca Contreras, “Cambridge, Maryland, Activists Campaign for Desegregation, USA, 1962–1963,” Global Nonviolent Action Database, last modified July 27, 2011, accessed July 30, 2020, https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/cambridge-maryland-activists-campaign-desegregation-usa-1962–1963; Hedrick Smith, “Martial Law Is Imposed in Cambridge, Md., Riots,” New York Times, July 13, 1963, 1, 6, https://nyti.ms/30fTf3i; and “Tawes Withdraws Last Guard Troops in Cambridge, Md.,” New York Times, July 8, 1964, 18, https://nyti.ms/39PfcK0,

But even if the power to declare martial law has not been used in decades, it still exists in the case law and in the record books — and it remains poorly understood.

footnote1_am0q6r0

Who stopped martial law in the Philippines?

I. Introduction President Ferdinand E. Marcos assumed power on December 30, 1965, and became the second president reelected to office in 1969. There were efforts to maneuver the 1971 Constitutional Convention to permit his continuing in office. With the swell of student radicalization and increasing number of violent demonstrations, Marcos played up middle-class fears and used these to justify the imposition of Martial Law on September 23, 1972 by virtue of Proclamation No.1081,

• Martial Law was not just an invocation of the President’s emergency powers under the 1935 Constitution —Marcos went further to assume all governing powers, excluded civilian courts, and systematically replaced the 1935 Constitution with the 1973 Constitution for his own ends.
• The replacement of the Constitution was done under dubious circumstances.

First, Marcos ordered a viva voce plebiscite on January 10–15, 1973 in which the voting age was reduced to 15 to ratify the new Constitution. Military men were placed prominently to intimidate voters. Reports indicated that mayors and governors were given quotas for “yes” votes on the constitution and negative votes were often not recorded.

Results report that 90 percent of the citizens have voted for the constitution even though some communities did not participate in the “citizens assemblies.” Over the next few years, Marcos would hold four more plebiscites—in 1973, 1975, 1976, and 1978—through citizen assemblies to legitimize the continuation of martial rule.

Second, he intimidated the Supreme Court to approve it. Using the stick and carrot method on the justices of the Supreme Court, President Marcos was able to force the Supreme Court to uphold martial law and the new constitution. Previously, around 8,000 individuals, including senators, civil libertarians, journalists, students, and labor leaders, were arrested and detained without due process upon the declaration of martial law.

With many of them filing petitions to the Supreme Court for habeas corpus, they challenged the constitutionality of the proclamation. However, the Supreme Court issued its final decision, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, which essentially validated the constitution. This would be the final legitimizing decision on the constitutionality of Martial Law: in G.R.

No. L-35546 September 17, 1974, the Supreme Court dismissed petitions for habeas corpus by ruling that martial law was a political question beyond the jurisdiction of the court; and that, furthermore, the court had already deemed the 1973 Constitution in full force and effect, replacing the 1935 Constitution.

• After the landmark decision, Chief Justice Roberto V.
• Concepcion went into early retirement, 50 days before his originally scheduled retirement date, in silent protest over the majority in the Javellana v.
• Executive Secretary case.
• He argued against the validity of the new constitution and its questionable aspects, together with Justices Claudio Teehankee, Calixto Zaldivar, and Enrique Fernando.

Martial law imposed government control over all forms of media. On September 22, 1972, Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No.1, ordering the Press Secretary and Defense Secretary to assume control over all media outlets. All periodicals were padlocked, and media personalities who had criticized Marcos, his family, or his administration were taken to Camp Crame without any charges being filed.

1. Among them were publishers Joaquin “Chino” P.
2. Roces ( Manila Times ) and Eugenio Lopez Jr.
3. Manila Chronicle ), and columnists Max Soliven and Luis D. Beltran.
4. Marcos issued at least eleven Presidential Decrees that suppressed press freedom.
5. Journalists who did not comply with the new restrictions faced physical threats, libel suits, or forced resignation.

With such stringent censorship regulations, most of the periodicals that were allowed to operate were crony newspapers, such as Benjamin Romualdez’s Times Journal, Hans Menzi’s Bulletin Today, and Roberto Benedicto’s Philippine Daily Express, These newspapers offered “bootlicking reportage” on the country’s economy while completely eschewing political issues.

1. Hence, President Marcos’ absolute rule had a “cloak of legality” and incontestability, making it nearly impregnable.
2. However, specific factors converged and eventually led to the fall of the dictatorship and the eventual restoration of democracy in the Philippines. II.
3. Factors that led to the Fall of the Dictatorship A.

Opposition to Martial Law in the 1970s Popular anti-Marcos sentiment existed for the duration of Martial Law. According to David Wurfel, there were three paramount types of opposition to martial law during the 1970s: reformist opposition, revolutionary opposition, and religious opposition.

Reformist Opposition The reformist opposition, also known as the legal opposition, was composed of members of the upper-middle class. Using nonviolent tactics, they advocated political (not necessarily socioeconomic) reforms. However, the reformist opposition was not a united movement, but an amalgamation of different middle- and upper-class groups who had different motives.

It was for this reason that Marcos tolerated them, so long as they were incapable of viably replacing him or attaining the support of the masses. David Wurfel writes: Disunity within the reformist opposition also reflected the diversity of interests and the lack of ideology within the middle class.

The reformers shared certain values, such as support for the rule of law, constitutional legitimacy, free elections, and the protection of personal freedoms, and they agreed on the need to replace Marcos. But they agreed on little else. On nationalism, land reform, and the autonomy of labor organizations there was everything from explicit demands to complete silence.

Once discussion went beyond the basic characteristics of the political process, the question of what to reform was a divisive one.1978 was a watershed year for the reformist opposition because it was the first election year in the country since 1969.

1. The reformist opposition was divided on the issue of boycotting the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP) elections set for April 7.
2. Senator Gerardo “Gerry” Roxas refused to reactivate the Liberal Party for the elections because Marcos failed to address their concerns regarding electoral reform; to participate in such an unfair election would have given it credibility, and the Martial Law regime undue legitimacy.

Jose W. Diokno, a former Nacionalista and long-time critic of Marcos and Martial Law, was also adamantly opposed to the IBP elections. The most prominent opposition movement that participated in the IBP elections was the newly formed Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) party of former senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr., who was imprisoned at that time.

1. Ninoy was initially apprehensive about running in the election, but he decided to push through with his candidacy to give the populace a chance to air out their frustration against the government.
2. He campaigned from his jail cell, even appearing for a 90-minute television interview.
3. Ninoy’s candidacy inspired an outpouring of popular support that culminated in a noise barrage on the evening before the elections.

At 8:00 p.m., residents in Metro Manila took to the streets, making whatever noise they could “to let Ninoy Aquino in his prison cell know that the people had heard his message.” They banged on pots and pans, honked their car horns, and shouted their throats sore in support of Ninoy and LABAN. Ninoy Aquino’s manifesto for the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) campaign for the elections. Photo from Ninoy: The Willing Martyr by Alfonso P. Policarpio Jr. In 1981, Marcos officially lifted Martial Law, but since all decrees issued during that time were still in force, the lifting was merely a symbolic gesture.

In the June presidential elections of that year, he ran under the KBL, his main opponent being Nacionalist Alejo Santos. Unlike in the 1978 IBP elections, the reformist opposition was united in its stance to boycott the polls,labeling it a sham after Marcos refused the conditions they had previously proposed, such as a minimum campaign period, a purging of voters’ lists, equal time and space for the opposition, and a reorganization of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

Revolutionary Opposition The government’s use of communist and secessionist threats as justification for Martial Law only contributed to the growth of the political opposition and the amassing of recruits to the New People’s Army (NPA) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the provinces in the 1970s.

• When Martial Law was declared, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was immediately mobilized.
• Formed by students and politicians from Mindanao, its goal was to create the Bangsa Moro Republik (Moro National Republic), composed of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan.
• The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) attempted to seize their “illegal” firearms supplied by Libya, sparking a war that lasted from 1973 to 1977.

Over the course of the war, 13,000 people were killed while over a million were displaced. At the height of the conflict, the government spent an estimated $1 million a day to contain the rebellion. However, internal problems within the MNLF prevented them from exploiting Marcos’ weakness.

• Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso write: Its military leaders lacked combat experience and suffered major battlefield losses, while its political leaders split along ethnic lines (Tausug versus Maguindanao) over tactical issues.
• As the MNLF lost on the military front, its politician allies also began to defect, making separate peace pacts with Marcos and presenting themselves as a “moderate alternative” to the revolutionary Moro nationalists.

Government overtures and the cooperation of conservative Arab states eventually led to negotiations and a de facto cease-fire in 1977. The MNLF was no match for Marcos diplomatically and the decline of Arab support made the continuation of conventional warfare impossible.

By the time Marcos fell, the MNLF had lost its dynamism as well. In contrast, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) strengthened as Marcos’ dictatorship weakened; as opposed to the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), which surrendered in 1974. Following the principle of “centralized command, decentralized operations,” the CPP established autonomous, regional, self-sustaining chapters all over the Philippines.

Not only did this give CPP cadres more freedom to experiment with tactics appropriate to their localities, it also helped them survive the loss of many original leaders, either to prison or death. In November, 1977, the Armed Forces scored an important victory over the communist rebels with the capture of Jose Maria Sison and other important party leaders leading to the disarray of the Communist Party.

But the triumph was short-lived and was too late as the influence of the CPP grew stronger within the provinces. Party growth was fastest in areas where human rights violations were high due to military presence. By the late 1970s, the CPP could claim a guerrilla force of 15,000, around the same number of cadres, and a “mass base” of around one million.

While AFP forces also experienced rapid growth during this period and were better equipped, there was a difference between the two. Gregg Jones writes that “espite a high rate of illiteracy, communist soldiers could explain why they were fighting and what they were fighting for.

In contrast, most government soldiers were poor peasants or slum dwellers who enlisted in the government army not out of political conviction but because of economic deprivation.” Through the Kilusang Mayo Uno (the May First Labor Movement) and the League of Filipino Students, the CPP was able to gather labor unions and solidify its control of important schools.

The CPP also made “anti-imperialist” alliances with nationalist senators like Lorenzo Tañada and Jose Diokno, who could lend credibility and publicity to claims of the Marcos government’s human rights violations. Religious Opposition Martial Law also faced opposition from the religious sector.

Mainline Protestant churches have been vocal in their opposition of the dictatorship since 1972; by 1978, they were holding mass protest actions, and by 1981, they held boycott campaigns for the April plebiscite and the June presidential elections. Meanwhile the Catholic Church, which sympathized with Marcos’ anti-communism, maintained a position of “critical collaboration” while paying attention to the opposition among its members.

This allowed it a degree of autonomy when it came to carrying out their social projects, which focused on alleviating poverty and defending the poor against communism. However, the provincial clergy started becoming radicalized after seeing the effects of the Marcos dictatorship on the poor.

• They formed Christians for National Liberation, which clandestinely used Church “social action” programs to get foreign funding through private donor agencies that shared the same views.
• Abinales and Amoroso write: Church leaders were appalled by this radical infiltration, but could do little about it.

To attack its own rank and file for following the official Church position on human rights and social justice would open the hierarchy to charges of supporting the dictatorship. A serious breach opened up within the Philippine Church. When Jaime Cardinal Sin replaced the conservative Rufino Cardinal Santos as Archbishop of Manila, one of his first acts was to issue a letter condemning the summary arrest of Jesuit Frs.

1. Jose Blanco and Benigno Mayo.
2. They were arrested during a raid on the Sacred Heart Novitiate in Novaliches, in 1974.
3. Sin presided over a prayer vigil for the detained priests, “which more than 5,000 persons attended, the largest anti-martial law protest at the time.” In 1975, Sin declared his opposition to a Marcos decree “banning all labor strikes.” US President Gerald Ford was visiting Manila, so Marcos beat a hasty retreat and confined the prohibition to strategic industries.

The harassment continued. Church-owned media, which had escaped closure in 1972, was shut down in 1976–1977, among them the weekly newspaper and radio station of Bishop Francisco Claver’s diocese in Bukidnon, Davao’s radio station, and Church magazines in Manila.

1. The government threatened to tax Church properties and subject them to urban land reform.
2. Sin’s policy of “critical collaboration” during this time began to give away to active resistance, as the religious indignation spread over the continuing arrests and more of the clergy became radicalized.
3. Sin may have thought to steal the thunder from the radical priests by hurling the bolts himself.

Protestant groups began to rally against Marcos in 1978. By 1979, Sin was firmly on the path to his preeminent role in the overthrow of Marcos. About 5,000 demonstrators, organized by students, attempted to march to Malacañan Palace on October 10, 1976 to protest at four years of Martial Law imposed by President Ferdinand E.

• Marcos. Its main purpose was to protest at the referendum-plebiscite scheduled to take place on October 16.
• Video from Associated Press.
• On January 17, 1981, in an effort to calm the growing opposition of the Catholic Church, President Marcos lifted martial law (if by name only) via Proclamation No.2045 in preparation for the first state visit of Saint Pope John Paul II on February 17, 1981.

On January 17, 1981, on Constitution Day (8 years after the 1973 Constitution was promulgated), President Ferdinand E. Marcos decreed Martial Law officially lifted. In this video excerpt, President Marcos reads from Proclamation No.2045. Video from PTV4.

• In the events leading to the important state visit, the Coconut Palace was commissioned by First Lady Imelda Marcos to be built at the cost of ₱37 million as the guesthouse of the Pope.
• However, the Pontiff refused, saying it was too ostentatious, given the state of the poor in the country.
• Moreover, during his visit in Malacañan Palace, the Pope delivered a speech explicitly condemning the human rights violations committed under the regime.

He said: “Even in exceptional situations that may at times arise, one can never justify any violation of the fundamental dignity of the human person or of the basic rights that safeguard this dignity.” Since then, the Catholic Church had withdrawn its support of the Marcos administration.B.

• Marcos’ Health and the Issue of Succession As early as 1979, the health of President Marcos had been deteriorating.
• This was kept a secret at first, but it was common knowledge then that Marcos was already sick, especially at the time of the assassination of Ninoy Aquino.
• Marcos’ health status worsened by mid-November of 1984.

Blas Ople, Marcos’ Minister of Labor, divulged the situation for the first time on record on December 3, 1984, saying that Marcos was “in control but cannot take major initiatives at this time.” He stated that, “The health of our leader is undergoing certain vicissitudes, problems which started a year ago.” On October 28, 1985, according to congressional and US intelligence sources quoted by the Washington Post, Marcos was diagnosed with an “incurable, recurring sickness” called systemic lupus erythematosus,

• This disease was further complicated by Marcos’ diabetes.
• Marcos’ failing health, coupled with the looming threat from the anti-capitalist left, led to widespread concern for a stable succession among the country’s economic elite—the main beneficiaries of Martial Law’s crony capitalism.
• The plebiscite held on April 7, 1981, ratified the constitutional amendment creating the Executive Committee, composed of at most 14 members, at least half of which were Assemblymen.

The Committee was meant to be “a stepping stone for future leadership in the country, a high-level training ground for future Prime Ministers and Presidents.” It was deemed necessary at that time because no one member of the administration’s Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) was deemed capable of taking over for President Marcos in the event of his death, resignation, or incapacitation; it was implied that the Committee member who performed the best would be Marcos’ successor.

Contenders for the presidency started positioning themselves to gain the upper hand. For instance, there were attempts to discredit Prime Minister Cesar Virata and the programs associated with economic technocrats, while Imelda Marcos’ strove to repair her tarnished image (especially in the provinces) while pushing her son Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr.

further into the public eye. However, Marcos’ deteriorating health necessitated clearer guidelines for determining a successor. Another plebiscite on January 27, 1984, ratified the constitutional amendment abolishing the Executive Committee and restoring the Office of the Vice President, to be filled in the upcoming 1987 elections —which never came because Marcos announced snap elections in 1985. Ousted President Marcos and Imelda Marcos in exile at the backyard of their villa overlooking Honolulu, Hawaii on March 1988. Diagnosed with systemic lupus erythematosus, he had several surgeries for kidney dialysis a year after this photo was taken. Marcos died on September 28 of the same year, due to heart, kidney and lung failure.

1. Photo by Gamblin Yann.C.
2. The Collapse of the Philippine Economy Economist James Boyce commented, “If the central aim of economic development is the reduction of poverty, then the Philippine development strategy in the Marcos era was an abysmal failure.” In the last years of the Marcos regime, the Philippine economy was almost grinding to a halt.

This was so, despite the fact that the Marcos administration implemented its three-pronged development strategy: (1) The green revolution in agriculture, (2) growth and diversity in agricultural and forestry exports, and (3) massive external borrowing.

1. The profit from these three strategies were amassed disproportionately to the wealthiest in the population, thereby causing a large disparity between the rich and the poor.
2. In the case of agriculture, the higher rice yields saved land for export crops and saved foreign exchange for non-rice imports, but these gains never trickled down to the poor.

In addition, there were government intervention, cronyism and monopolization of agricultural markets such as that of sugar and coconut. In these cases, key government agencies were managed by Marcos associates and cronies, whose operations were not audited.

1. Sugar was the country’s second most important export in the Marcos regime.
2. Specifically, in the mid-1970s, sugarcane plantations doubled to more than 500,000 hectares.
3. This increase, however, did not translate to an increase in harvest and profit, which led ultimately to a stagnation and eventual decline in the mid-1970s.

As early as 1974, a government sugar monopsony was established to participate in world trade and reap the benefits of increasing world prices in sugar. When the sugar market declined in 1975 – 1976, the trading responsibilities were transferred to PHILSUCOM (Philippine Sugar Commission), headed by Roberto Benedicto, and to NASUTRA (National Sugar Trading Corporation), headed by an associate of Marcos.

Under Benedicto’s chairmanship, the PHILSUCOM was empowered to buy, sell, and set prices for sugar; and to buy and take over milling companies. He also set up the Republic Planter’s Bank, which became the sugar industry’s main source of finance during that time. For this, Benedicto was accused of “using his position to great advantage over the past several years to forge an economic fiefdom, to amass great wealth and to develop considerable political influence in sugar growing areas”.

The US Embassy reported that Benedicto had several profit mechanisms:

bribery; acceptance of payoffs or bribes from traders lobbying for guaranteed profit margins of sugar prices in the domestic market. smuggling of sugar supplies; at least 600,000 metric tons of raw sugar was reportedly missing from the NASUTRA warehouses withholding of taxes, PNP loan payments, as well as export trading costs;

These operations “amount to a significant and growing drain on the economy of the country.” Moreover, the sugar-marketing monopoly effectively protected the interests of the sugar hacienderos close to Marcos, while small landowners bore the brunt of the crisis, causing widespread starvation among sugar plantation workers (specifically in Negros), reaching the international media.

Furthermore, other large-scale sugar owners grew resentful of President Marcos because of the sugar-marketing monopoly that did his bidding and the subsequent land-grabbing. At the end of the Marcos regime, the Philippine sugar industry nearly collapsed. The majority of the planters were in debt and sugarcane plantation dwindled.

In the case of coconuts, beginning in 1973, the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) monopolized export and increased coconut tax in order to stabilize market prices. Coconut marketing during the Marcos era was monopolized by a “single entity with effective control over virtually all copra purchases and over the production and sale of coconut oil on the domestic and export markets.” This monopoly was technically made possible by Marcos’ presidential decrees, providing for levies on all coconut production and an establishment of a bank.

While these changes were imposed to benefit the the coconut growers, in practice, the main beneficiaries were Eduardo Cojuangco, the so called “Coconut King,” and Juan Ponce Enrile, two of President Marcos’ closest associates. In in the case of foreign loans, the primary pretext was for Philippine domestic investment and building public infrastructure.

However, these loans were diverted to a few private companies, all of which were under Marcos cronies, eroding the quality and quantity of domestic investments; the rest were diverted to banks abroad. An example of striking evidence of this was the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, which was built at the cost of $1.2 billion but never generated a kilowatt of electricity under the Marcos regime.

The losers were the Philippine people,” writes Raymond Bonner, “the poor, on whose behalf the billion dollars could have been better spent, as well as the middle class and the wealthy, who would have to shoulder this economically backbreaking colossus.” In 1973, Marcos decided that the Philippines had to have a nuclear power plant—then considered the hallmark of a modern nation—because it fit in with Marcos’ ostentatious vision of himself and the country.

However, such an endeavor at that time was problematic: at best, the power plant would have generated power for only 15 percent of Luzon’s population. Security was another issue: there were four active volcanoes located within 100 miles from the proposed site.

Furthermore, the Philippines was one of the poorest nations setting out on the nuclear path; only Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea were building nuclear power plants in East Asia, and they were far better off economically and technologically. The power plant was the largest and most expensive construction project in the country’s history.

Given the monumental expense, funding the project out of the government’s treasury was impossible, so the government turned to Export-Import Bank in Washington, DC, for assistance. In 1975, $277 million in direct loans and $367 million in loan guarantees was approved by Ex-Im Bank chairman William J.

1. Casey, one of Marcos’s biggest supporters.
2. It was the largest loan package the bank had approved anywhere.
3. Westinghouse Electric initially submitted a vague, undetailed $500 million bid for two plants.
4. General Electric, on the other hand, submitted four full volumes detailing cost and specifications, conducted nuclear power seminars in Manila, and invited Philippine officials to visit its plant in California.

Marcos, brooking no opposition, gave the contract to Westinghouse. After Westinghouse secured the contract, it submitted a serious proposal amounting to $1.2 billion for just one reactor—almost 400 percent higher than the original bid of $500 million.

Marcos was guaranteed a cut of nearly $80 million, which Westinghouse transmitted through Marcos crony Herminio Disini using a “maze of channels, cutouts, and stratagems.” Raymond Bonner elaborates: Disini owned a construction company, which he had purchased with a government-backed loan and which had been awarded, without bits, a cost plus fixed fee contract for all civil construction at the nuclear power plant site.

The price of the equipment for the project “was inflated, as a way to cover the cost of the fees to Disini,” a lawyer who worked on the project explained to Fox Butterfield of The New York Times, Westinghouse set up a subsidiary in Switzerland, which funneled the money into Disini’s European bank accounts.

The Swiss subsidiary, after entering into the deal with the Philippine government, assigned the contract to the Westinghouse International Projects Company, which had been established solely to handle the Philippine project. Westinghouse International, in turn, entered into a subcontract with the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the parent company in Pittsburgh.

Westinghouse officials repeatedly denied any wrongdoing with the project. By 1986—more than a decade and $1.2 billion later—the power plant was still not operational. Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. Photo courtesy of Vinnell Belvoir Corporation. The old economic elite, whom President Marcos called the “oligarchy,” relatively tolerated the systematic favoritism of the administration on crony companies. This changed In 1981, when Filipino Chinese business tycoon Dewey Dee of the Binondo Central Bank left the country for Canada, leaving nearly P600 million in debt, seriously compromising the crony corporations.

• Government banks announced a rescue fund of approximately P5 billion in credit and equity capital, which the old elite found unfair, launching a barrage of public criticism.
• The impoverishment of the economy led to the loss of support of the middle class and the small-time landowners and farmers in the regions on the Marcos administration.

Poverty, aside from human rights violations by the military, also became a means for rebel groups to recruit citizens to their cause. In 1978, the strength of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) grew from 6,900 to over 20,000 regulars. In 1980, the New People’s Army formed 26 guerrilla fronts with over 16,000 regulars, and the Communist Party of the Philippines have attracted 40,000 mass activists.D.

• The Assassination of Ninoy Aquino After three years of exile in the United States, Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr.
• The foremost leader of the Marcos opposition, decided to come back to the Philippines, intending to restore democracy in the country and convince President Marcos for an orderly succession.

Previously, Aquino had been incarcerated by the military for seven years before being released for bypass surgery in the United States. Ninoy Aquino’s conversation with journalist Teodoro Locsin Jr. before he went back to the Philippines was revealing.

He was quoted as saying: “I’ll go to Marcos, if he’ll see me. I’ll appeal to his sense of history, of his place in it. He would not be publishing all those books of his if he did not care for the judgment of history, if he did not want to look good in it. And that would be possible, I’ll tell him, only if there was an orderly restoration of democracy and freedom for our people.

Otherwise, there would be only revolution and terrible suffering. I give the moderate opposition five years to restore democracy, after that there will be only the Communists as an alternative to Marcos or his successor. I’ll offer my services to him, but my price is freedom for our people.” He departed from Boston on August 13, 1983. Ninoy Aquino’s assassination. Photo taken from Ninoy: Ideals & Ideologies 1932-1983. Aquino landed in the Manila International Airport via China Airlines Flight 811 at 1:05 p.m. on August 21, and was escorted by armed men out of the plane. Minutes later, gunshots were heard.

The former senator was shot dead by an assassin’s bullet to the head. When the news of Ninoy’s death spread, approximately seven million came to his funeral procession on August 31, the biggest and longest in Philippine history. This singular event further eroded the people’s support of the Marcos regime.E.

The Failure of the Snap Election of 1986 In the first week of November 1985, when President Marcos was interviewed in the David Brinkley Show, he stated his intention to call for a snap election, even going so far as to invite the members of the US Congress to observe, calling the accusation of fraud as unfounded.

• This, it seems, was an attempt to consolidate support and show the United States the legitimacy of the Marcos administration.
• The announcement for a snap election within three months was ahead of schedule; the next regular elections were supposed to be held in 1987.
• The President was overconfident; he disregarded the objections of his family, his Cabinet, and his party.

Even First Lady Imelda Marcos, who was abroad at the time, was also reportedly taken aback by the announcement. However, as recent scholarship suggests, this confidence only showed his isolation from the people whose support on his administration had already waned.

1. Marcos’ Labor Minister, Blas Ople writes: He (Marcos) couldn’t say that he was beleaguered and encircled, that he was losing the support of Washington and the international community and that he needed a breakthrough to reestablish his ability to govern.
2. He was never that frank with us but we knew why.

Marcos had to consolidate his forces if the election would go to his favor. As it was before the declaration of Martial Law, Marcos needed the support of the military. While acting Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos was next in line as the Chief of Staff, the president knew that he needed Fabian Ver back.

Ver was on leave, as he was being prosecuted in the Aquino-Galman murder case. By December 2, 1985, Ver and 26 other suspects were acquitted in a legal decision that caused public outrage. Meanwhile, prior to the snap election announcement, a “Convenor Group” was formed, composed of Lorenzo Tañada, Jaime V.

Ongpin, and Cory Aquino, to select a presidential candidate for the opposition. Cory was regarded as the rightful candidate, the “people’s choice,” who was also promoted by Jaime Cardinal Sin. For fear of being left out, Salvador Laurel of the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) and Eva Kalaw of the Liberal Party (LP) formed the National Unification Committee’s (NUC).

Laurel was nominated by the NUC’s Nominating Convention held at the Araneta Coliseum as the presidential candidate of the opposition party for the coming Snap elections. Meanwhile, Cory Aquino announced her intention to run if a snap election was to be held, and if she had the support of a million citizens.

She was successful in gaining this support. The opposition, therefore had two frontrunners: Aquino, and former Senator Salvador “Doy” Laurel. However, in the same year, on December 7, Laurel decided to give way to Aquino. Though initially reluctant, Laurel was eventually convinced that their tandem was the only way the opposition stood a chance against the overwhelming influence of Marcos and the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), and decided to run as Aquino’s vice president. President Ferdinand E. Marcos attends a rally prior to the Snap Elections. Photo by Peter Charlesworth. Cory Aquino with her son, Benigno S. Aquino III. on the campaign trail, 1986. Photo from Teddy Locsin Jr. During the 1986 snap elections, President Ferdinand E. Marcos used gender as an issue in his campaign broadcast against rival for the presidency, Corazon C.

• Aquino. This broadcast warns that a woman would not be able to handle the challenges of the post.
• Businessman Jose Concepcion headed a group of concerned citizens to revive the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), established in 1957 after the fraud of the 1949 Presidential election, as the citizens’ watchdog on the counting of votes.

It had a successful run in the legislative elections of 1984, releasing an unofficial untampered count. KBL attempted to discredit NAMFREL, but due to international pressure, COMELEC gave the watchdog organization official observer status. Massive poll fraud and rampant cheating marred the vote on the day of the elections, February 7, 1986.

Thousands of registered voters—who had voted successfully in previous elections—found their names suspiciously missing from the lists. Approximately 850 foreign correspondents flew in to observe, including a delegations headed by U.S. senators and congressmen, who saw vote rigging happen. On February 9, 35 COMELEC employees and computer operators at the COMELEC Tabulation Center walked out in protest due to the wide discrepancy between the computer tabulation and the tally board, showing blatant manipulation of electoral results.

In the countryside, precincts were hounded by the military and ballot-rigging was rampant. NAMFREL, in turn, showed Aquino in the lead with almost 70 percent of the votes canvassed. Afraid of ruling party goons who have been known to snatch ballot boxes to throw them away or to stuff them with favorable manufactured votes, vigilantes form human barricades for boxes being brought from precincts to municipal halls for official tally. Photo by Ben Avestruz, People Power: The Philippine Revolution of 1986. On February 9, 1986, thirty-five tabulators manning the COMELEC’s quick count computer terminals walked out during the 1986 snap elections. Photo from Bantayog Museum.

LIST OF 35 TABULATORS WHO WALKED OUT
Linda (Kapunan) Angeles-Hill	Rory Asuncion	Zoe Castro	Mario Lavin
Myrna “Shiony” Asuncion-Binamira	Bot Bautista	Charles Chan	Thess Baltazar-Roberto
Jane Rosales-Yap	Erlyn Barza	Nori Bolado	Euly Molina-Legro
Cooly Culiat-Medina	Rubi Macato-Slater	Erick Celestino	Nitro Palomares-Castro
Alicia Torres	Dennie Estolas-Vista	Marissa Contreras-Legaspi	Maite de Rivera
Ernie Alberto	Achie Concepcion-Jimenez	Bambi Flor-Sena	Bing Romero-Justo
Marisa Briones-Allarey	Maleen Cruz-Ngan	Naz Gutierrez III	Vangie Saludares
Marissa Almendral	Mina Fajardo Bergara	Luchie Lavin	Irma Sunico-Buno
Gi Antonio-Silva	Jules Valderrama	Celine Vinoya-Rivera

By February 15, 1986, in an unprecedented announcement that was met with public outrage, the Batasang Pambansa proclaimed Marcos and Arturo Tolentino as the winners of the presidential and vice-presidential race respectively, by virtue of Resolution No.38, Opposition assemblymen walked out of the Session Hall in protest. Twenty-six parliamentary members walk out from the floor of the National Assembly just before the assembly proclaimed President Ferdinand Marcos winner of the February 7 election. The official tally had Marcos the victor over Corazon Aquino by 1.5 million votes.

Photo by Jun Brioso. This led to the opposition’s indignation rally in Luneta the next day where Cory Aquino spoke to around two million people in Luneta, in what would be known as the Tagumpay ng Bayan rally. At the event, Aquino called for massive civil disobedience and boycott of Marcos-crony owned companies and products.

The Aquino-Laurel ticket also proclaimed victory. The International Observer Delegation, composed of 44 delegates from 19 different countries who observed the electoral process, also released their report citing disturbing anomalies in the election results and subsequent intimidation of voters. Supporters of Cory Aquino and Salvador Laurel holding a ‘Victory of People’ or ‘Tagumpay ng Bayan’ rally, February 16, 1986. Photo from LIFE Photo Collection. February 25 was chosen as the day of President Marcos’ inauguration. As inaugural invitations were sent to the diplomatic corps, none of embassies sent their congratulatory remarks to Marcos, except for Soviet ambassador Vadim Shabalin, who was apparently in Malacañan for a courtesy call.

When President Marcos informed him of the supposed result of the election, the ambassador offered his compliments, which is now cited as a grave diplomatic error. The silence of foreign governments alarmed the administration. On February 22, 1986, Marcos sent Labor Minister Blas Ople and Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor to the United States, and sent J.V.

Cruz and Presidential Assistant for General Government Jacobo Clave to Europe, in a last ditch effort to legitimize his win in the presidency. Roberto Benedicto and Arturo Tolentino were to be sent to Japan, and the ASEAN countries respectively. Because of the calls for a boycott of crony companies announced by Cory Aquino, San Miguel Corporation fell in the stock market.

The Manila Bulletin also lost a significant number of readers.F. Coup Plot by the RAM The Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) emerged in 1982 as a small, secret group intent on strengthening military rule through a coup d’état. Initially, it was composed of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and a handful of regular officers from the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), who harbored resentment against General Fabian Ver, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

The divide between PMA-trained regulars and officers from the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) was already evident in the early years of Martial Law. Marcos appointed ROTC officers to the top positions in the army, navy, and air force, passing over senior PMA graduates.

1. When Ver succeeded Romeo Espina as Marcos’ Chief of Staff, Ver was quick to isolate his rivals.
2. Ignoring merit or seniority,” writes Alfred McCoy, “he played upon ethnicity, blood, and school ties to pick favorites for key commands.” Himself an alumnus of the University of the Philippines reserve program, he promoted former reservists and retained them even after their mandatory retirement, thus stifling the upward mobility of PMA-trained regulars.

By early 1985, the RAM was a fully organized group with a leadership committee of 11 men and a membership base of around three hundred. Although relatively small, the RAM had the support of a majority of AFP officers, especially the PMA regulars. By the middle of the year, the RAM went public, yet popular suspicion regarding the movement’s integrity arose due to its inclusion of former military torturers.

Still, most media outlets ignored their human rights record, choosing instead to paint the RAM as reformers. Plans for a Christmas coup in 1985 were started in August, but when President Marcos unexpectedly called for snap elections in November, RAM leaders had to rethink their strategy, and the coup was postponed for the following year.

When Marcos was proclaimed the winner in the fraudulent February 7 elections, the RAM leaders agreed to launch their coup at 2:00 a.m. (“H-hour”) on Sunday, February 23, 1986. The plan was as follows: At 1:30 a.m., Colonel Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan and twenty commandos would cross the Pasig River on rubber rafts and break into the Malacañan Palace, arresting President Marcos and Imelda.

At 2:00 a.m. Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo “Red” Kapunan would command a hundred-man strike team to attack the security compound on the southern bank of the Pasig. Using smoke grenades as cover, they would detonate bombs and kill General Fabian Ver. The explosions would serve as a signal for two motorized RAM columns to break through the gates of the security compound.

Major Saulito Aromin’s 49th Infantry Battalion would launch a simultaneous maneuver, posing as pro-Marcos reinforcements to reinforce Honasan’s commandos and secure the Palace. At 2:30 a.m, the Presidential Security Command would transmit false orders to eight pro-Marcos battalions in the capital to keep them from moving.

At the same time, Colonel Tito Legazpi would capture Villamor Airbase and radio RAM units in the provinces to fly to Manila. At 3:00 a.m., just an hour after the coup’s launch, Enrile would issue Proclamation No.1, establishing a revolutionary government. Yet for all the RAM leaders’ confidence in their plan, they did not have the command experience to successfully carry out the complicated operation, after almost ten years of sitting in air-conditioned offices.

And to make matters worse, Ver knew of the coup. On the Thursday before the planned coup, he summoned his senior officers and engineered a trap. He ordered a navy demolition team to plant bombs and mines along the palace riverfront. As the rebels made their way toward the palace on rafts, Ver would blind them with powerful spotlights.

Marcos’ son, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., would be brought out with a loud hailer, giving the rebels a final chance to surrender. If the rebels did not stand down, they would be blown sky high. The rebels only realized that their plan had been compromised on the Friday night before the coup, when Honasan and Kapunan saw a large number of troops amassing at Malacañang.

They informed Enrile about the situation, and the assault on the palace had to be called off. The map used by General Fabian Ver to plan out the attack on Camp Crame and Camp Aguinaldo, superimposed onto a current aerial photograph of the area. This map was drawn on a blackboard and remains on display in the Presidential Museum and Library. Faced with only two options—dispersing or regrouping—Enrile chose the latter as the “more honorable” option.

• He announced his defection from Marcos on Saturday night in a press conference at Camp Aguinaldo, alongside Lieutenant General Fidel V.
• Ramos, Ver’s deemed successor.
• In the first critical hours of the uprising, RAM leaders called on former PMA classmates and comrades, pleading for support or at the very least neutrality, thus undermining Marcos’ defenses.

At 9:00 p.m., Jaime Cardinal Sin made his famous announcement over Radio Veritas, beseeching the people to bring food and gather at Camps Aguinaldo and Crame to support Enrile and Ramos. An hour later, Enrile finally reached Cory Aquino via telephone.

1. Aquino was at an anti-Marcos rally in Cebu City.
2. She was informed of the coup, but she was also suspicious of Enrile’s motives.
3. Half a day later, she announced her support for the rebellion and asked the people to help.
4. On that first night, people came to EDSA by the thousands with whatever provisions they could offer: pans of pancit, boxes of pizza, tins of biscuits, bunches of bananas.

Edwin Lacierda, presidential spokesperson of President Benigno S. Aquino III, was there to witness: “More than a rally,” he recalls, “all of us came to EDSA to break bread and fellowship with all who were willing to stand in the line of fire and take the bullet, as it were, for freedom and change of government.” Thus began the four-day EDSA People Power Revolution,

• The revolution was a peaceful one, with soldiers being coaxed with food, prayers, flowers, and cheers by people from all walks of life who sat, stood, and knelt in prayer in front of the tanks.
• For instance, on February 24, the government-controlled Channel 4 was liberated by women who were sent into the compound to negotiate with the loyalist soldiers.

Church-owned radio station Radio Veritas did a marathon coverage of the revolution; disc jockey June Keithley, who averaged seventeen hours on air daily over the four days, kept the public informed in between airings of Ang Bayan Ko, Tie a Yellow Ribbon, and a curiously resurrected political jingle from the 1950s called Mambo Magsaysay,

In the evening of February 22, Marcos personally telephoned General Prospero Olivas five times, ordering him to disperse the crowd at Camp Aguinaldo, because their presence would complicate an assault. A mentee of Ramos, Olivas feigned compliance and countermanded Marcos’ orders. Marcos then turned to General Alfredo Lim, the Metrocom district commander, but Lim was also loyal to Ramos and disregarded Marcos’ orders.

In addition to the reluctance of Marcos’ officers, Marine Commandant Artemio Tadiar also pointed out the military incompetence of Ver’s plan, saying, “Every inch of the palace was occupied, literally.” “There were over eight thousand men packed so tightly in the narrow streets around the palace that they had no room to maneuver, and reinforcements were still arriving.” On February 24, at 5:00 a.m., Marcos was heard over the radio, “We’ll wipe them out.

1. It is obvious they are committing rebellion.” On that Monday morning, government troops headed by Marine battalions began their advance to Camp Crame from different directions as a dozen of helicopters encircled the camp.
2. At 6:20 a.m., the tensed crowd around the Constabulary Headquarters waited with uncertainty as the helicopters approached.

Wurfel narrates one of the pivotal events of People Power as fear turned into loud cheers from the crowd: When eight helicopters circled over Camp Crame on Monday morning, fears of bombardment were still high, but they landed and joined the rebels. This was probably the military turning point; thereafter military defections took place at an increasing pace.

Yet Ver threatened to bomb and strafe Camp Crame, and Marcos held a press conference where he insisted, “I don’t intend to step down as President. Never, never!” At 8:30 a.m., government troops broke into the rear of Camp Aguinaldo and trained their howitzers and mortars on Camp Crame. By 9:00 a.m., General Josephus Ramas gave the Fourth Marine brigade the “kill order” while civilians were still inside, but the brigade’s commander Colonel Braulio Balbas hesitated.

Instead, he told Ramas, “We’re still positioning the cannons.” Ramas would ask Balbas to attack four times, and each time, Balbas stalled. Marcos lost control of the Marines. At around the same time, a rebel frigate anchored at the mouth of the Pasig River had its guns aimed at Malacañan, just three kilometers away.

Earlier that morning, Naval Defense Force chief Commodore Tagumpay Jardiniano told his men that he had declared himself for Enrile and Ramos. His men stood up and applauded, and Marcos lost control of the navy. At 9:15 a.m., Marcos, together with Ver appeared on television for a Press Conference. Ver requested Marcos permission to attack Camp Crame.

But Marcos postured on TV to restrain Ver, saying, “My order is to disperse without shooting them.” However, when Marine commandant General Artemio Tadiar met with Ver later, Ver confirmed that Marcos approved the kill order on Crame. Following a rocket attack from the rebel helicopters, General Ver radioed the wing commander of the F-5 fighters in Manila, ordering them to bomb Camp Crame.

Francisco Baula, the squadron leader and RAM member, answered sarcastically: “Yes, sir, roger. Proceeding now to strafe Malacañang.” At 1:00 p.m., General Ver gave secret orders to Major General Vicente Piccio to launch an air attack on Camp Crame, to which General Piccio replied, “But, sir, we have no more gunships.

They have just been destroyed.” Marcos lost control of the air force. After Marcos lost complete control of the military, his presidency came to an end the following day, on February 25, 1986. Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile (right) is joined by Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos as he announces his defection from the Marcos administration. Photo taken from Bayan Ko! III. Conclusion From February 22 to 25, 1986, hundreds of thousands of people amassed at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA), Metro Manila’s main thoroughfare, calling for the peaceful ouster of the dictator.

On February 25, 1986, Corazon C. Aquino and Salvador H. Laurel took their oaths in Club Filipino as President and Vice President respectively. Meanwhile, Marcos was inaugurated in the Ceremonial Hall of the Malacañan Palace and delivered his inaugural address in Maharlika Hall (now Kalayaan Hall ) on that same day.

Rocked by key military and political defections and the overwhelming popular support for Aquino, Marcos was forced to depart with his family a few hours later for exile in Hawaii, effectively ending Marcos’ two-decade long dictatorial rule. By March 1986, intelligence sources surfaced indicating that President Marcos was planning to stage widespread bombing and arson operations throughout Manila, so he could impose another martial law—called “Operation Everlasting.” The plan was to neutralize all opposition by arresting all opposition leaders, the entire executive council of NAMFREL and the RAM rebels in a planned concentration camp in Caballo Island near Corregidor. The Philippines had its “longest day” on February 25, 1986, as it started the day with virtually no president, had two presidents by noon, and one president before midnight. TOP, oath taking as President by Corazon C. Aquino at Club Filipino before Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee.

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Endnotes “Editorial:Constitutional Convention or Malacañang Kennel?” Philippine Free Press, January 22, 1972, accessed February 18, 2016, link, Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office (PCDSPO), Philippine Electoral Almanac, rev.

• And exp. edition (Manila: PCDSPO, 2015), 115.
• David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay, (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press), 116. Ibid.
• PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 116-120.
• Rigoberto Tiglao, “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” in Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s Power, eds.

Aurora Javate-De Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol (Manila: Conspectus Foundation Inc., 1988), 26. Rosalinda Pineda Ofreneo, The Manipulated Press: A History of Philippine Journalism Since 1945 (Mandaluyong City: Cacho Hermanos Inc., 1984), 135.D.H.

Soriano, Amadeo R. Dacanay, Paulina F. Bautista, and R.R. Marcelino, The Roces Family, Publishers: With a History of the Philippine Press (Quezon City: Islas Filipinas Publishing, 1987), 125; Dominador D. Buhain, A History of Publishing in the Philippines (Quezon City: Rex Book Store, 1998), 98. Gerald Sussman, “Politics and the Press: The Philippines Since Marcos,” Philippine Studies 36, no.4 (1988): 495.

Tiglao, “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” 30. Ibid.29. David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1988), 204. Ibid., 205. Ibid. Ibid., 208-209. Ibid., 206. Manuel F. Martinez, Aquino Vs. Marcos: The Grand Collision (Quezon City: Manuel F.

• Martinez, 1987), 342.
• Ibid., 340-341.
• Emmanuel S.
• De Dios, “The Erosion of the Dictatorship,” in Aurora Javate-de Dios, Petronilo Bn.
• Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, eds., Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s Power (Metro Manila: Conspectus Foundation, 1988), 70. Ibid.
• PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 122.

Ibid., 125. Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, 2005), 217. Ibid., 219; Benigno Aquino Jr., “Jabidah! Special Forces of Evil,” Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, March 28, 1968, accessed November 27, 2015, http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1968/03/28/jabidah-special-forces-of-evil-by-senator-benigno-s-aquino-jr/ ; Proclamation No.1081 s.1972 (September 21, 1972); “Third Republic,” Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, accessed November 27, 2015, http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/featured/third-republic/,

• Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 217.
• Ibid., 217 and 219.
• Ibid., 219.
• Manuel Quezon III, “Road to EDSA”, Today Newspaper, February 25, 1996, February 22, 2016, http://mlq3.tumblr.com/post/3415013093/the-road-to-edsa,
• Gregg Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 225-226.

Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 220. De Dios, “The Erosion of the Dictatorship,” 128. Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 220. Ibid. Ibid. Manuel L. Quezon III, “The Road to EDSA,” Today, February 25, 1996, accessed February 18, 2016, link,

Katherine Ellison, Imelda: Steel Butterfly of the Philippines, (Lincoln, Nebraska: iUniverse, Inc., 1988), 206, “One can never justify any violation of rights’: John Paul II stands up to a dictator,” GMA News Online, April 27, 2014, accessed February 16, 2016, link, Alfred W. McCoy, Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy (London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 226.

Editorial, “If,” Philippine Free Press, August 23, 1986, link. “Aide confirms illness of Marcos,” The New York Times, December 4, 1984, accessed February 10, 2016, link, “Marcos reported stricken by fatal illness,” Chicago Tribune, October 18, 1985, accessed February 10, 2016, link,

Marcos seriously ill with rare disease lupus, U.S. sources say,” Los Angeles Times, January 17, 1986, accessed February 10, 2016, link, Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 235. PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 123. Muego, “The Executive Committee in the Philippines,” 1159. Ibid. Ibid., 1167. PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 128-129.

Carolina G. Hernandez, “Reconstituting Political Order,” in Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond, ed. John Bresnan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 182. PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 130. James K. Boyce, The Political Economy of Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1993), 347.

1. The Green Revolution was a strategy of introducing new rice technologies to Philippine agriculture, utilizing scientific research of international agencies and applying it to Philippine crops such as rice.
2. Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 90-91. John M.
3. Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 232.

Ibid., 233. Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 169-170. Ibid., 210. Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice, 232. Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 210. Ibid., 211. Ibid., 180. Jeffrey Riedinger, Agrarian Reform in the Philippines: Democratic Transitions and Redistributive Reform, (California: Stanford University Press, 1995), 130.

Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 212. Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice, 232. Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 205. Ibid, 205. Ibid., 348. Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy (New York, NY: Times Books, 1987), 264.

Ibid., 265. Ibid., 267. Ibid. Ibid., 265. Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 238. Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 219; Aquino, “Jabidah! Special Forces of Evil,” http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1968/03/28/jabidah-special-forces-of-evil-by-senator-benigno-s-aquino-jr/ ; Proclamation No.1081 s.1972; “Third Republic,” http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/featured/third-republic/,

1. Rigoberto Tiglao, “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” in Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s Power, eds.
2. Aurora Javate-De Dios, Petronilo Bn.
3. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol (Manila: Conspectus Foundation Inc., 1988), 66.
4. Teodoro M.
5. Locsin, “The Conscience of the Filipino: The Sacrifice,” Philippine Free Press Online, August 20, 1986, accessed February 16, 2016, link,

Ibid. Gemma Nemenzo Almendral, “The Fall of the Regime,” in Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s Power, eds. Aurora Javate-de Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol (Metro Manila: Conspectus Foundation, 1988), 176. Ibid., 180. Gemma Nemenzo Almendral, “The Fall of the Regime,” 180.

Ibid., 177. Ibid., 185. Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 296. David G. Timberman, A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 131. “Salvador Laurel Diary,” Philippine Diary Project, June 12, 1895, link, Wurfel, 183. PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 132.

Almendral, “The Fall of the Regime,” 200. Ibid., 201. Ibid. Table: Composition and Distribution of U.S. Observer Delegations for the February 7, 1986 Presidential Elections, January 15 to February 15, 1986, from the reconstructed files of COMELEC, Office of the President/National Media Production Center-International Center, and Embassy of the Philippines, Washington, D.C.

COMELEC Employees’ Union, “COMELEC UNION: 1986 poll employees’ walkout provided spark for EDSA People Power Revolt,” InterAksyon.com, February 24, 2013, accessed February 11, 2016, link, Reynaldo Santos, “1986 COMELEC Walkout Not about Cory or Marcos,” Rappler, February 25, 2013, accessed February 15, 2016, link,

International Observer Delegation, A Path to Democratic Renewal: A Report on the February 7, 1986 Presidential Election in the Philippines, accessed February 17, 2016, link, Nick Joaquin (Quijano de Manila), The Quarter of the Tiger Moon: Scenes from the People Power Apocalypse (Manila: Book Stop, 1986), 11.

Leszek Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992), link, Joaquin, The Quartet of the Tiger Moon, 13. McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 231. Ibid., 225. Ibid., 227. Ibid., 229-230. Ibid., 232. Ibid., 237 Ibid., 233. Ibid., 233-234. Ibid., 241. Ibid., 237-238. Ibid., 238. Ibid., 241. Ibid., 243.

Joaquin, The Quarter of the Tiger Moon, 19. McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 244. Ibid., 245. Angela Stuart-Santiago, “Chronology of a Revolution,” accessed on February 18, 2016, link, Cory Aquino was informed by Bel Cunanan, ibid. McCoy, Closer than Brothers 246.

Joaquin, The Quartet of the Tiger Moon, 19. Edwin Lacierda, “Where were you?” Rappler, February 25, 2015, accessed February 17, 2016, link, Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 305. Joaquin, The Quartet of the Tiger Moon, 62. Ibid., 44. McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 244. Ibid., 248. Angela Stuart-Santiago “Chronology of a Revolution,” accessed on February 18, 2016, link,

Ibid. McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 251. Ibid. McCoy, 250. Santiago, “Chronology of the Revolution,” link, Ibid., McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 251. McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 251-252. Santiago, “Chronology of the Revolution,” link, Associated Press News Archive, “Military reveals arson, bombing plot during Marcos’ last days with Am-Philippines”, March 6, 1986, accessed on February 22, 2016, http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1986/Military-Reveals-Arson-Bombing-Plot-during-Marcos-Last-Days-With-AM-Philippines/id-6f34fa5e77ac9e74672552beed788564 Beth Day Romulo, Inside the Palace: The Rise and Fall of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, (Feffer & Sons, 1987), p.223-225.

What is martial law in easy words?

1 : the law applied in occupied territory by the military authority of the occupying power 2 : the law administered by military forces that is invoked by a government in an emergency when the civilian law enforcement agencies are unable to maintain public order and safety

How to declare martial law in the Philippines?

We strongly support the declaration of martial law in Mindanao effective on 23 May 2017 by President Rodrigo Roa Duterte. We condemn in no uncertain terms the spate of violence and hostilities in the City of Marawi allegedly perpetrated by suspected members of the Maute Group, which has cost the loss of lives, the destruction of several properties, the disruption of services of vital public installations and services, and instilling fear and anxiety on the general populace.

• Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President of the Republic to declare martial law for a period not exceeding 60 days in cases of rebellion and invasion, when public safety requires it.
• We believe that the act of President Duterte in declaring martial law is indeed a decisive move on the part of the country’s commander-in-chief in order to immediately suppress lawless violence and neutralize the tense situation in Marawi City at the soonest possible time to prevent the violence from spreading further to other parts of the country.

As local chief executives, we commit to be more vigilant in ensuring peace and security in our respective areas of jurisdiction to prevent the escalation of lawless violence and we extend our assistance and support to our beleaguered brothers and sisters as we continue to pray for sustained peace in our nation, especially in Mindanao. GOV. EDGAR M. CHATTO Secretary-General Attested by: GOV. AL FRANCIS C. BICHARA National Chairman GOV. RYAN LUIS V. SINGSON National President Click here to get a copy of the originally signed document in PDF Format.

Can the president declare war?

Joint Resolution of November 7, 1973, Public Law 93-148, 87 STAT 555, Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President; 11/7/1973; NAID 7455197 – The War Powers Resolution of 1973 (also known as the War Powers Act) “is a congressional resolution designed to limit the U.S.

• President’s ability to initiate or escalate military actions abroad.” As part of our system of governmental “checks and balances,” the law aims to check the executive branch’s power when committing U.S.
• Military forces to an armed conflict without the consent of the U.S. Congress.
• It stipulates the president must notify Congress within 48 hours of military action and prohibits armed forces from remaining for more than 60 days.

The Constitution divides war powers between Congress and the president. Only Congress can declare war and appropriate military funding, yet the president is commander in chief of the armed forces.

Is Ukraine under martial law?

573/2022 as of 12 August2022, martial law in Ukraine will last at least until 21 November 2022.

Can you use a gun to stop a fight?

Deadly Force – Is deadly force ever permitted when acting in self-defense? Yes. However, at the time you act, you must reasonably believe that you are in imminent danger of being killed or seriously injured. The level of force you use cannot exceed the threat with which you are faced.

Can the US military declare martial law?

Who Can Declare Martial Law? – Martial law can be declared by the U.S. president, the governor of a state or, in limited emergencies, by a local military commander. How and when it is declared is governed by a series of laws.

What is the cost of martial law in the Philippines?

Gross domestic product – 1970–1980 Growth Rates of GDP per capita (in%) The GDP of the Philippines rose during the martial law, rising from $8.0 billion to $32.5 billion in about 8 years. This growth was spurred by massive lending from commercial banks, accounting for about 62% percent of external debt.

As a developing country, the Philippines during the martial law was one of the heaviest borrowers. These aggressive moves were seen by critics as a means of legitimizing martial law by purportedly enhancing the chances of the country in the global market. Much of the money was spent on pump-priming to improve infrastructure and promote tourism,

However, despite the aggressive borrowing and spending policies, the Philippines lagged behind its Southeast Asia counterparts in GDP growth rate per capita. The country, in 1970–1980, only registered an average 3.4 percent growth, while its counterparts like Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia garnered a mean growth of 5.4 percent.

How many went missing during martial law?

The dictatorship of Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the 1970s and 1980s is historically remembered for its record of human rights abuses, particularly targeting political opponents, student activists, journalists, religious workers, farmers, and others who fought against the Marcos dictatorship.

Based on the documentation of Amnesty International, Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, and similar human rights monitoring entities, historians believe that the Marcos dictatorship was marked by 3,257 known extrajudicial killings, 35,000 documented tortures, 77 ‘ disappeared ‘, and 70,000 incarcerations.

Some 2,520 of the 3,257 murder victims were tortured and mutilated before their bodies were dumped in various places for the public to discover – a tactic meant to sow fear among the public, which came to be known as “salvaging.” Some victims were even subjected to cannibalism.

Can martial law be imposed in whole country?

By Shivank Goel | Updated : November 14th, 2022 Martial law can be declared in any area within the territory of India under Article 34 of the Indian Constitution, The Indian constitution makes no specific reference to or definition of martial law. Additionally, there is no such clause giving any executive the power to impose martial law.

What are the grounds when the president can declare martial law?

First extension – On July 23, 2017, lawmakers voted 261–18 (with no abstention among those present) in favor of the President Rodrigo Duterte ‘s request to give extension to Proclamation Order No.216 during a special joint session of the House of Representatives and the Senate,

• This extension was valid until December 31, 2017.
• The majority number required for the approval of martial law is at 158 of the 314 members of Congress.
• Under the Constitution, the President can declare martial law for an initial period of 60 days and ask for its extension in case of rebellion, invasion or when public safety requires it.

The incumbent Senators who voted for NO are as follows: The incumbent Representatives who voted for NO are as follows: The incumbent Senators who were ABSENT are as follows:

Can cities declare martial law?

AFAIK, only a military commander, or a civilian who has authority over the military (the President in the case of federal forces, a state governor in the case of state military forces) can declare martial law. When martial law is declared, who is in charge?

What Channel Is Lone Star Law On?

What Is Municipal Law?